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ABSTRACT 
 
THE IMPACT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION-RUSSIA RELATIONS ON 
CREATING A COMMON EU ENERGY POLICY 
Kara, Sinem 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Pınar İpek 
September 2008 
 
This thesis aims to understand the bilateral relations of five key member states of 
the European Union, namely Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Austria, 
with Russia in supplying their energy need and to discover how these relations affect the 
EU policy making process in creating a common energy policy in the light of two 
theories of European integration: intergovernmentalism and liberal 
intergovernmentalism. The thesis reaches three main conclusions on how the national 
preferences of five key member states are formed, to what extent these preferences 
affect intergovernmental bargaining or interstate negotiations on creating a common EU 
energy policy, and whether the result of this bargaining process is in favour or against 
the goal of EU to achieve a common energy policy. First, the national preferences of 
these states are driven by issue-specific economic interests. Second, national preferences 
of these states have a considerable impact on their decisions on creating a common EU 
energy policy. Finally, diverse and plural interests of these states on the liberalisation of 
EU electricity and gas sectors and their relations with Russia to differing degrees had an 
impact on EU policy making process in achieving a common EU energy policy. 
Keywords: Energy Dialogue, European Union, Russia, intergovernmentalism, liberal 
intergovernmentalism 
 iii
 
 
 
 
 
 
ÖZET 
 
AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ-RUSYA İLİŞKİLERİNİN AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ ORTAK 
ENERJİ POLİTİKASI OLUŞTURULMASINA ETKİSİ 
Kara, Sinem 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr Pınar İpek 
Eylül 2008 
 
 Bu çalışma, Avrupa Birliği’nin beş önemli üye ülkesi olan Almanya, Birleşik 
Krallık, Fransa, İtalya ve Avusturya’nın enerji ihtiyaçlarını karşılamakta Rusya’yla olan 
iki yönlü ilişkilerini anlamayı ve bu ilişkilerin, Avrupa Birliği’nde ortak bir enerji 
politikası oluşturma sürecini nasıl etkilediğini keşfetmeyi, iki bütünleşme teorisinin ışığı 
altında hedefler: hükümetlerarası ve liberal hükümetlerarası kuram. Bu çalışma üç ana 
sonuca ulaşmaktadır. Beş üye ülkenin ulusal çıkarlarının nasıl şekillendiği, Avrupa 
Birliği ortak enerji politikası oluşturulurken bu ulusal çıkarların hükümetlerarası 
pazarlıkları veya devletlerarası görüşmeleri ne oranda etkilediği, son olarak bu 
pazarlıkların sonucunun Avrupa Birliği ortak enerji politikası amacını destekleyip 
desteklemediği tartışılmıştır. Öncelikle, beş üye ülkenin ulusal çıkarlarının ‘konu-
özellikli’ ekonomik çıkarlar doğrultusunda şekillendiği sonucuna varır. Daha sonra, bu 
ülkelerin ulusal çıkarlarının Avrupa Birliği ortak enerji politikası oluşturulması üzerinde 
önemli bir etkisi olduğuna ulaşır. Son olarak, bu ülkelerin Avrupa Birliği elektrik ve gaz 
sektörlerinin özelleştirilmesi üzerine farklı ve çeşitli tercihlerinin, Rusya ile farklı 
seviyedeki ilişkilerinin Avrupa Birliği ortak enerji politikası oluşturulmasını etkilediği 
sonucuna varır. 
Anahtar kelimeler: Enerji Diyalogu, Avrupa Birliği, Rusya, hükümetlerarası kuram, 
liberal hükümetlerarası kuram 
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 CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The European Union (EU) with its twenty-seven member states tries to find a 
unique voice in terms of creating common policies in the union such as a common 
energy policy. However, it is hard to achieve a common sense among the EU members. 
All are sovereign states and many of them are not willing to give up their sovereign 
rights on certain issues in the process of converging national policies into the EU 
common policies. The common energy policy is one of the most crucial aspects of the 
process of deepening that the EU members have been reluctant to reach a consensus on 
so far. 
However, there have been challenges in the process of creating a common energy 
market starting with the initiatives and policy recommendations outlined since the 
issuance of the Green Paper for the first time in 2000. In this thesis, the focus is on five 
members of the EU, namely Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Austria, 
whose proven natural energy resources are not enough to meet the energy demand of 
those countries. Thus, they are dependent on imports from other countries to different 
degrees. Increasingly, there is a greater dependence on imports of natural energy 
resources, particularly natural gas, from the Russian Federation. Within this framework, 
this thesis seeks to answer two major questions: (i) how do these countries pursue their 
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bilateral relations with the Russian Federation in terms of supplying their energy need 
and (ii) do these countries’ bilateral relations with Russia in energy affect the EU of 
forming a common energy policy? 
 
Table 1: The EU Member States’ Dependency Rates on Russian Natural Gas Imports 
(2005 Statistics) 
 
Country Gross Inland 
Energy 
Consumption 
(ktoe) 
Share of Gas in 
Gross Inland Energy 
Consumption 
(%) 
Total 
Imports of 
Gas (bcm) 
Share of Russian 
Gas in Total Gas 
Imports 
(%) 
Share of Russian 
Gas Imports in 
Gross Inland Energy 
Consumption (%) 
BE-Belgium  54 952 26 18.92 5.1 5.1
BG-Bulgaria 19 884 14 2.85 100 87.7
CZ-Czech Republic 44 795 17 9.48 76.1 75.1
DK-Denmark 19 538 23 - - -
DE-Germany 345 451 23 90.70 41.7 37.9
EE-Estonia 5 563 14 0.97 100 100
IE-Ireland 15 121 23 3.05 - -
EL-Greece 31 240 8 2.40 83.6 82.8
ES-Spain 143 486 21 11.59 - -
FR-France 275 438 15 36.20 19.5 19.8
IT-Italy 186 766 38 70.99 31.8 27.0
CY-Cyprus 2 461 - - - -
LV-Latvia 4 718 29 1.75 100 >100
LT-Lithuania 8 592 29 2.93 100 >100
LU-Luxembourg 4 698 25 1.40 - -
HU-Hungary 27 920 43 10.82 73.4 59.5
MT-Malta 953 - - - -
NL-Netherlands 80 963 44 17.58 - -
AT-Austria 33 980 24 8.68 70.0 68.8
PL-Poland 93 935 13 10.21 65.9 46.1
PT-Portugal 26 677 14 2.62 - -
RO-Romania 39 146 36 6.25 100 30.1
SI-Slovenia 7 305 13 1.10 59.8 59.6
SK-Slovakia 19 407 31 6.40 100 >100
FI-Finland 34 515 10 4.20 100 100
SE-Sweden 51 555 2 1.03 - -
UK-United Kingdom 232 259 37 14.65 - -
 
Source: BP, 2006: 30. European Commission and Eurostat, 2007a: 32, 2007b and 2007c: 56 
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Figure 1: Volume and Structure of Gazprom’s Gas Sales Far Abroad in 2007, bcm and % 
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Source: Gazprom Website, last accessed on 28 August 2008. 
 
Being dependent particularly on Russian exports of gas, the members of the EU 
became vulnerable to any changes that would affect the supply of natural resources, 
since three countries, namely Russia, Norway and Algeria, are the major gas exporters to 
the EU. Thus, the EU needs to diversify its countries of origin to meet its increasing gas 
demand (See Table 1 and Figure 1). One recent experience that highlighted the 
vulnerability of the EU was the energy crisis between the Russian Federation and 
Ukraine in January 2006. The energy crisis was a result of a price hike maintained by the 
Russian Federation against Ukraine. Because Ukraine was reluctant to accept this price 
hike, the Russian company Gazprom turned off the pipelines. This crisis not only 
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strained the relations between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, but also led the 
Russian Federation into a confrontation with the members of the EU. Turning off the 
pipelines indirectly affected the Russian exports of natural energy resources going into 
the EU. Therefore, after the energy crisis, the EU revised its energy policy and 
concentrated its efforts to secure new energy resources for the members of the EU. 
Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Austria are chosen to seek a 
plausible explanation for the research questions. These countries are selected because 
they are key member states of the EU and they have different levels of energy 
dependency as well as bilateral relations with Russia. To understand the bilateral 
relations of these countries with the Russian Federation in supplying their energy need 
and how the ongoing relationship with Russia affects the EU policy making process in 
achieving a common energy policy, an attempt to apply both intergovernmentalist and 
liberal intergovernmentalist theories is made to seek a plausible explanation. 
First of all, in the following section two theories of European integration will be 
examined briefly: intergovernmentalism and liberal intergovernmentalism. Following 
this section in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 will cover the significant role of energy in Russian 
foreign policy. It will also seek to explore the energy policy of the EU by examining the 
Green Papers of 2000 and 2006 of the European Commission. Then, it will study the 
EU-Russia dialogue on energy by looking at the mechanisms for continuing the 
dialogue, the developments influencing the dialogue such as the Ukraine-Russia energy 
crisis, price hike in Turkmen gas, and the Sochi and Samara Summits between the EU 
and Russia. The section about the major natural gas supplies will be discussed under two 
headings: existing and proposed pipelines. Yamal-Europe I will be covered as the 
existing natural gas pipeline between the EU and Russia. Then, the projects of Nord 
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Stream, South Stream and Yamal-Europe II will be examined under the heading of 
proposed pipelines. 
Chapter 3 will then examine the energy outlooks of the selected countries, 
namely Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Austria. Then, with reference 
to the energy policy of the EU outlined in Chapter 2, it will try to answer the question of 
whether these countries have convergent or divergent interests with the EU as an 
organization. Finally, the relations between these selected countries and Russia will be 
examined to find a more plausible explanation for these countries’ stance on the 
common energy policy of the EU. 
Finally, Chapter 4 will seek to review how the theories discussed in Chapter 1, 
intergovernmentalism and liberal intergovernmentalism, explain the selected countries’ 
bilateral relations with the Russian Federation in supplying their energy need and how 
these relations with Russia in energy affect the EU policy making process in achieving a 
common energy policy. 
 
 
1.1. Theories of European Integration 
 
 
1.1.1. Intergovernmentalism 
 
Intergovernmentalism is a political science approach to integration (Mattli, 1999: 
19). This approach prioritises states in studying integration; it is a “state-centred work on 
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the European Communities (EC)” (Rosamond, 2000: 75). One of the advocates of 
intergovernmentalism, Stanley Hoffmann, describes states as the basic units of the 
international system. Since states are the basic and major players, national interests of 
these states have crucial roles in world politics as well. Hoffmann defines interests as 
such: “state interests ... are constructs in which ideas and ideals, precedents and past 
experiences, and domestic forces and rulers all play a role” (Hoffmann, 1995: 5). 
Rosamond also adds that states’ interests are “diverse rather than convergent” 
(Rosamond, 2000: 76). Hoffmann argues, “Any international system would be likely to 
produce diversity rather than synthesis among the units. The present system was 
‘profoundly conservative’ of diversity” (Rosamond, 2000: 76). According to Rosamond 
(2000: 76), this diversity would be the natural end of plurality of domestic imperatives 
and the uniqueness of every state’s position in the international system. 
The diverse and plural interests of states lead Hoffmann to the analysis of “high” 
and “low” politics. According to the study of Hoffmann on high and low politics, states 
would be reluctant to integrate in issues –high politics– that might jeopardize their 
national interests while, on the other hand, low politics is an area where states feel 
secure to integrate. Hoffmann differentiates high and low politics “to explain why 
integration was possible in certain technocratic and uncontroversial areas and why it was 
likely to generate conflict in matters where the autonomy of governments or components 
of national identity were at stake” (Rosamond, 2000: 77). 
Carole Webb (Rosamond, 2000: 79) criticises Hoffmann’s analysis of high and 
low politics and indicates: 
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The development of the Common Foreign and Security (CFSP) and the 
commitment to enact Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) within a 
specified period can be seen as instances where member states willingly 
surrendered control over issues of central importance to national 
sovereignty.  
 
Therefore, the members of the Union are unwilling to integrate in issues of high 
politics and reluctant to integrate in some important issues, for instance a common 
energy policy. The reason is that every state has distinct interests and continues to 
strengthen their energy security according to the traditional perspective of national 
security. The Union tries to create a common energy policy among its members, but 
aforementioned members of the Union, namely Germany, the United Kingdom, France, 
Italy, and Austria have different levels of relationship with Russia in securing 
particularly their gas supplies. 
 
 
1.1.2. Liberal Intergovernmentalism 
 
Liberal intergovernmentalism is the other theory of European integration used to 
examine the attitudes of the aforementioned five member states of the EU towards 
establishing a common energy policy within the Union and forming close ties with 
Russia on energy. 
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Andrew Moravcsik (Pollack, 2000: 18), the pioneer of liberal 
intergovernmentalism, proposes: 
A three-step model, which combines: (1) a liberal theory of national 
preference formation with; (2) an intergovernmental model of EU-level 
bargaining; and (3) a model of institutional choice emphasizing the role of 
international institutions in providing ‘credible commitments’ for member 
governments. 
 
Frank Schimmelfennig (Wiener and Diez, 2004: 76) also studies Moravcsik’s 
liberal intergovernmentalism according to “three levels of abstraction.” At the highest 
level of abstraction, Schimmelfennig observes the fundamentals of liberal 
intergovernmentalism in rationalist institutionalism of International Relations theory, 
which “seeks to explain the establishment and design of international institutions as a 
collective outcome of interdependent (‘strategic’) rational state choices and 
intergovernmental negotiations in an anarchical context” (Wiener and Diez, 2004: 76-
77). At a medium level of abstraction, Schimmelfennig outlines above model of 
Moravcsik with three theories: “a liberal theory of national preference formation, a 
bargaining theory of international negotiations, and a functional theory of institutional 
choice.” At the lowest level of abstraction, Schimmelfennig gives an overview of main 
propositions of Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism in European integration. 
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Table 2: Overview of Liberal Intergovernmentalism 
 
Level of Abstraction Preferences Cooperation Institutions 
High IR rationalist institutionalism: state actors in international anarchy, 
rational choice of international institutions 
Medium Liberal theory of state 
preferences 
Bargaining theory Functional theory of 
institutional choice 
Low Domestic economic 
interests 
Intergovernmental 
asymmetrical 
interdependence 
Credible 
commitments 
 
Source: Wiener and Diez, 2004: 76 
 
The first step of Andrew Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism, liberal 
theory of state preferences, touches upon domestically determined and diverse national 
interests of EU member states. According to this theory, national interests of member 
states are defined by state-society relations, in other terms, domestic societal actors 
determine these interests (Moravcsik, 1993: 481). So, through domestic political 
bargaining between national governments and domestic societal actors, national 
preferences are formed. 
At the lowest level of abstraction, with regard to European integration, 
aforementioned national preferences are driven by “issue-specific economic interests” 
(Wiener and Diez, 2004: 78-79). Moravcsik (1998b: 3) argues that these preferences 
reflect “primarily the commercial interests of powerful economic producers” and 
“secondarily the macro-economic preferences of ruling governmental coalitions”. 
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Table 3: The Liberal Intergovernmentalist Framework of Analysis 
 
Liberal Theories Intergovernmentalist Theories 
(International demand 
for outcomes) 
 (International supply of 
outcomes) 
 
Underlying societal 
factors: pressure from 
domestic societal actors 
as represented in 
political institutions 
 Underlying political 
factors: intensity of 
national preferences; 
alternative coalitions; 
available issue linkages 
 
NATIONAL 
PREFERENCE 
FORMATION 
configuration of 
state preferences 
INTERSTATE 
NEGOTIATION 
OUTCOMES 
 
Source: Moravcsik, 1993: 482 
 
The second stage, bargaining theory of international negotiations as 
Schimmelfennig terms, follows the liberal stage of national preference formation. Once 
the national interests of member states are defined, states try to realize these interests 
through intergovernmental bargaining without the interference of a higher institution 
like the European Commission (Pollack, 2000: 18). Moravcsik (1993: 481) makes an 
interesting analogy between these two stages and demand-supply functions: 
A domestic preference formation process identifies the potential benefits of 
policy co-ordination perceived by national governments (demand), while a 
process of interstate strategic interaction defines the possible political 
responses of the EC political system to pressures from those governments 
(supply). The interaction of demand and supply, of preference and strategic 
opportunities, shapes the foreign policy behaviour of states. 
 
 Schimmelfennig (Wiener and Diez, 2004: 77), at this stage of Moravcsik’s three-
step model of liberal intergovernmentalism, refers to rationalist institutionalism, which 
differentiates “first- and second-order problems of international collective choice in 
problematic situations of international interdependence.” When states individually 
choose to opt out from cooperation, this will in the end not make them better off. 
Schimmelfennig (Wiener and Diez, 2004: 77) describes these problems as such: 
The first-order problem consists in overcoming such collectively 
suboptimal outcomes and achieving coordination or cooperation for mutual 
benefit. The second-order problems arise once the suboptimal outcomes are 
overcome. First, how are the mutual gains of cooperation distributed 
among the states? Second, how are states prevented from defecting from an 
agreement in order to exploit the cooperation of others? 
 
 So, Moravcsik’s intergovernmental model of EU-level bargaining or bargaining 
theory argues the aforementioned outcomes are determined by “the relative bargaining 
power of the actors,” which is influenced by to what extent these actors access 
‘information’ and by the ‘benefits of cooperation’ compared to “outside options” 
(Wiener and Diez, 2004: 77). Schimmelfennig (Wiener and Diez, 2004: 77) argues, the 
more information the actors have, more bargaining power they acquire in interstate 
negotiations, which in turn result in a favourable outcome for these actors. In addition, if 
the actors have outside options, then they will have more power to influence the 
outcome of bargaining process. 
 Moravcsik’s intergovernmental model of EU-level bargaining focuses on the 
second-order problem of how the mutual gains of cooperation are distributed among the 
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states or in other words, “distribution of gains from substantive cooperation” (Wiener 
and Diez, 2004: 79). In this context, he distinguishes the relatively more bargaining 
power of member states compared to supranational institutions, here the EU, since these 
institutions lack necessary ‘information’ to bargain successfully (Wiener and Diez, 
2004: 79). 
 Third and final stage of Moravcsik’s three-step model of liberal 
intergovernmentalism, functional theory of institutional choice, argues states, in order to 
avoid first- and second-order problems discussed by Schimmelfennig, agree to establish 
international institutions (Wiener and Diez, 2004: 78). Regarding the first-order 
problems of achieving coordination or cooperation for mutual benefit, Schimmelfennig 
(Wiener and Diez, 2004: 78) argues, 
international institutions may help states reach a collectively superior 
outcome, above all by reducing the transaction costs of further international 
negotiations on specific issues and by providing the necessary information 
to reduce the states’ uncertainty about each other’s preferences and 
behaviour. 
 
 The second-order problems, of how the mutual gains of cooperation are 
distributed among the states, and how states are prevented from defecting from an 
agreement in order to exploit the cooperation of others, may be overcome by 
introduction of certain rules and sanctions in order to ensure states “commit themselves 
credibly to their mutual promises” (Pollack, 2000: 18; Wiener and Diez, 2004: 78). 
 Recalling the lowest level of abstraction, EU member states rely on the Union in 
order to overcome the second-order problem of how states are prevented from defecting 
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from an agreement in order to exploit the cooperation of others. Moravcsik also argues 
that member states are more prone to transfer sovereignty to EU if the gains from 
cooperation and the risks of non-compliance are high (Moravcsik, 1998b: 9, 486-487). 
So, following chapters seek to address the main focus of this thesis of how 
Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Austria pursue their bilateral relations 
with the Russian Federation in terms of supplying their energy need, and whether these 
countries’ bilateral relations with Russia in energy affect the EU of forming a common 
energy policy in the context of intergovernmentalist premises and Moravcsik’s three-
step model of liberal intergovernmentalism. 
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 CHAPTER 2 
 
THE ROLE OF ENERGY IN EU-RUSSIA RELATIONS 
 
 
 This chapter seeks to explore the crucial role of energy in Russian foreign policy 
and the challenges in creating a common energy policy among the EU member states. 
Then, it addresses the dialogue between the EU and Russia on energy, and how certain 
developments affected this dialogue in addition to a brief description of the current, 
under-construction and planned pipelines from Russia to the EU countries. 
 
 
2.1. The Importance of Energy in Russian Foreign Policy 
 
 The end of the Cold War brought the collapse of the bipolar international system, 
where the United States and Russia were the super powers, and left the international 
environment dominated by economic interests (TÜRKSAM Website, last accessed on 24 
August 2008): 
With the end of the Cold War, the era of bipolar ideological struggle has 
been superseded by an international relations environment basically 
dominated by competition of economic interests, where relations are 
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determined by economic factors and the one in which economic 
considerations attain priority on the agenda of foreign policies of states. 
 
 Relations based on ideological and security rivalry during the Cold War were 
replaced by economic relations after the war, especially under the former President of 
Russia, Vladimir Putin. Therefore, Russia, possessing the most crucial energy resources 
in its territory, started to put emphasis on energy in its foreign policy agenda (Jaffe and 
Manning, 2001; Balzer, 2005; Olcott, 2004). 
 There are both internal and external reasons why Russian foreign policy shifted 
from its military security orientation to energy based foreign policy. As an internal 
reason, the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991, Russia 
was facing difficulties in transforming its centrally-planned economy into a liberal 
economy. During this process, the energy sector was the major contributor to Russian 
economy since it provides 45% of the export revenues of Russia and constitutes 39% of 
its government budget (TÜRKSAM Website, last accessed on 24 August 2008). 
 In fact, an article written by the former President of Russia, Vladimir Putin 
himself in 1999 suggests that natural resources were perceived as crucial in the recovery 
of Russian economy (Balzer, 2005: 219). Putin emphasised his argument as follows: 
The existing socio-economic conditions and also the strategy for Russia’s 
exit from the deep crisis and restoration of its former power on a 
qualitatively new basis demonstrate that the condition of the natural 
resource complex remains the most important factor in the state’s 
development in the near term (Balzer, 2005: 219). 
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 Aware of the importance of energy sector, influential companies in this sector, 
such as Gazprom, Lukoil and Transneft, try to have a voice in the government decision-
making process, especially in Russian foreign policy, because they have certain energy 
projects abroad. In addition, since state is the major partner of these companies and 
managerial staff of these companies has strong ties with government bureaucracy, these 
companies have leverage in government decision-making process. 
 Thus, Putin, when he came to power, declared that he would challenge the 
oligarchs within the state; he could control the oligarchs of energy sector who might 
create a problem for him in internal political system. In this way, these oligarchs would 
not have a strong voice in the internal political system, but they would be given 
opportunities to be effective in foreign policy (TÜRKSAM Website, last accessed on 24 
August 2008). Therefore, Putin took the necessary steps to control the oligarchs in the 
energy sector. 
 The arrest of Yukos CEO Mikhail Khodorkovsky, one of the oil oligarchs in 
Russia, on 25 October 2003, is a crucial event to understand Putin’s desire to control the 
oligarchs of energy sector. So, Putin consolidated domestic power so as to boost state 
revenues from energy exports as well as to increase Russia’s role in international 
politics. Olcott (2004: 13) indicates, “from Putin’s point of view, there seem to have 
been two separate issues: 1) Khodorkovsky’s political ambitions, and 2) the evolving 
international posture of Yukos.” Yukos executives arranged the sale of 25-40% of the 
company’s assets to two western firms, namely ChevronTexaco and ExxonMobil. This 
arrangement would have lessened state control over the energy sector. 
 Therefore, Putin’s emphasis on ‘state control’ over the energy sector in the 
country has had a crucial role in the shift to an energy-based foreign policy. Putin 
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indicated that state should be responsible for the development and use of its natural 
resources (Balzer, 2005: 218). Putin elaborated on his idea of the necessity of state 
control: 
Unfortunately, when market reforms began the state lost control of the 
resource sector. However, now the market euphoria of the first years of 
economic reform is gradually giving way to a more measured approach, 
allowing the possibility and recognizing the need for regulatory activity by 
the state in economic processes in general and in natural resource use in 
particular…. A contemporary strategy for rational use of resources cannot 
be based exclusively on the possibilities of the market. This applies even 
more to conditions of economic development in a transition, and, thus, to 
the Russian economy (Balzer, 2005: 218). 
 
Putin, then describes the steps to be taken in order to develop and use its natural 
resources (Olcott, 2004: 21): 
- completing the changeover to a rational combination of administrative 
and economic (i.e. market driven) means in the state regulation of natural 
resources, 
- creating an efficient system of state organs of management in the area of 
natural resources, that includes the clear delineation of their functions and 
base of coordination, 
- developing a legal basis for stimulating innovation and investment in the 
area of natural resource use, 
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- optimising the volumes and increasing the diversification of sources of 
investment in the production, consumption and protection of natural 
resources, 
- developing state regulation of export-import operations in the sphere of 
natural resources, 
- ensuring the delineation of rights and functions of both the federal organs 
and of the subjects of the Russian Federation in the area of natural 
resources, 
- implementing state support for scientific research (in these areas), 
- creating the conditions for the balanced use of natural resources as the 
basic factor in the country’s stable development, 
- accounting for regional features in the use of natural resources to improve 
the functioning of the Russian economy as a whole. 
 
 The external reasons why Russian foreign policy shifted from military security to 
its energy basis are first of all, after the collapse of the East Bloc, the bipolar system and 
ideological rivalry ended. Now, the new world order has been based on economic 
interests and these interests are subjects of struggle between states today. So, taking into 
consideration economic rivalry, both national security and foreign policy doctrines of 
Russia gave importance to ‘geoeconomy’ instead of ‘geostrategy’. Secondly, the West is 
against re-expansion of Russian military influence in the former Soviet territories. 
Lastly, energy could be used by Russia as a tool to influence the former Soviet territories 
again (TÜRKSAM Website, last accessed on 24 August 2008). 
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2.2. The Energy Policy of the European Union 
 
 The European Union, having scarce natural resources in its territory, consumes 
more energy than it produces. Only 0.6% of world oil and 2% of world natural gas 
reserves are located in the EU (EIA, 2006). Therefore, the EU relies upon energy 
imports. According to the BP Statistical Review of 2006, the EU imported 41% of 
natural gas from Russia, 25% from Norway and 15% from Algeria in 2005. 
 Taking into consideration this scarcity of domestic natural resources, production-
consumption imbalance and EU dependency on energy imports, a common energy 
policy among the EU member states has turned out to be an important step to overcome 
the aforementioned problems. 
 A common energy policy is one of the most crucial aspects of the process of 
deepening of the EU that the member states have so far been reluctant to reach a 
consensus on. However, on 29 November 2000, the first step was taken by the European 
Commission in adopting a Green Paper: Towards a European Strategy for the Security 
of Energy Supply. Also, on 8 March 2006, another Green Paper: A European Strategy 
for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy was adopted by the Commission. The 
following two sections give an outlook of the changing emphasis of the two Green 
Papers. 
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2.2.1. Green Paper of 2000: Towards a European Strategy for the 
Security of Energy Supply 
 
 The first Green Paper, adopted in 2000, underlined the importance of growing 
consumption of energy by the member states and the consequent increase in the volume 
of imports. The paper indicates, “If no measures are taken, in the next 20 to 30 years 
70% of the Union’s energy requirements, as opposed to the current 50%, will be covered 
by import products” (The Green Paper, 2000: 2). 
 The dependency on energy imports, especially on natural gas imports from 
Russia, Norway and Algeria, has led the European Commission to underline the 
importance of this issue in its Green Paper (2000: 41): 
In the long run, the supply of gas in Europe risks creating a new situation 
of dependence, all the more so given the less intensive consumption of 
carbon. Greater consumption of gas could be followed by an upward trend 
in prices and undermine the European Union’s security of supply. 
 
 So, the Green Paper of 2000 has outlined a strategy to manage demand by 
reducing energy consumption and encouraging energy savings, to diversify EU energy 
sources by using nuclear energy, coal, biofuels and renewables, to create a competitive 
internal energy market by liberalising EU electricity and gas markets, and to control 
supply side by diversifying the origin of energy supplies. 
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2.2.2. Green Paper of 2006: A European Strategy for Sustainable, 
Competitive and Secure Energy 
 
 The second Green Paper of 2006 focuses on three major objectives of a European 
energy policy: how to create an internal energy market, and, once this is created, how 
competitiveness can be ensured; sustainability; and security of supply. 
Sustainability refers to “(i) developing competitive renewable sources of energy 
and other low carbon energy sources and carriers, particularly alternative transport fuels, 
(ii) curbing energy demand within Europe, and (iii) leading global efforts to halt climate 
change and improve local air quality” (The Green Paper, 2006: 17). 
Security of supply indicates “tackling the EU’s rising dependence on imported 
energy through (i) an integrated approach – reducing demand, diversifying the EU’s 
energy mix with greater use of competitive indigenous and renewable energy, and 
diversifying sources and routes of supply of imported energy, (ii) creating the 
framework which will stimulate adequate investments to meet growing energy demand, 
(iii) better equipping the EU to cope with emergencies, (iv) improving the conditions for 
European companies seeking access to global resources, and (v) making sure that all 
citizens and business have access to energy” (The Green Paper, 2006: 18). 
Competitiveness addresses “(i) ensuring that energy market opening brings 
benefits to consumers and to the economy as a whole, while stimulating investment in 
clean energy production and energy efficiency, (ii) mitigating the impact of higher 
international energy prices on the EU economy and its citizens and (iii) keeping Europe 
at the cutting edge of energy technologies” (The Green Paper, 2006: 17-18). Regarding 
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these aims, the Commission (2007: 7), in its Communication to the European Council 
and the European Parliament, proposed two options for unbundling EU gas and 
electricity markets to liberalise these markets which in turn would create a competitive 
internal energy market: 
A full Independent System Operator (where the vertically integrated 
company remains owner of the network assets and receives a regulated 
return on them, but is not responsible for their operation, maintenance or 
development) or ownership unbundling (where network companies are 
wholly separate from the supply and generation companies) (emphasise 
added). 
 
 Following the three major objectives, sustainability, security of supply and 
competitiveness of The Green Paper of 2006, the Directorate General for Competition of 
the European Commission issued a report on energy sector of EU titled as “DG 
Competition Report on Energy Sector Inquiry” on 10 January 2007. 
The Energy Sector Inquiry has focused on certain key areas where immediate 
action is necessary in order to ensure secure energy supplies at competitive prices by 
opening up Europe’s gas and electricity markets to competition and by creating a single 
European energy market (Commission of the European Communities, 2007a: 2-3): 
(1) market concentration/market power, (2) vertical foreclosure (most 
prominently inadequate unbundling of network and supply), (3) lack of 
market integration (including lack of regulatory oversight for cross border 
issues), (4) lack of transparency, (5) price formation, (6) downstream 
markets, (7) balancing markets, and (8) liquefied natural gas (LNG). 
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The inquiry then calls for initiatives to be taken to address the shortcomings of 
aforementioned areas. “Achieving effective unbundling of network and supply activities, 
removing the regulatory gaps (in particular for cross border issues), addressing market 
concentration and barriers to entry, and increasing transparency in market operations” 
are the four main areas of concern (Commission of the European Communities, 2007a: 
3). 
According to the findings of the inquiry, both EU gas and electricity markets are 
highly concentrated and there is limited level of new entries in these markets. The 
vertically integrated incumbent companies still dominate both markets where they 
“control up-stream gas imports and/or domestic gas production,” “trade only a small 
proportion of their gas on gas exchanges (‘hubs’),” “exercise market power by raising 
prices,” or conclude long-term contracts with suppliers (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2007a: 5). 
Inadequate unbundling of network and supply adds up to high level of market 
concentration constituting obstacles to new entries in EU gas and electricity markets and 
threatening security of supply (Commission of the European Communities, 2007a: 6). 
Vertical foreclosure leads to limited access of new entrants to gas networks, to storage 
and to LNG terminals and to “operational and investment decisions to be taken on the 
basis of the supply interests of the integrated company rather than in the interest of 
network/infrastructure operations” (Commission of the European Communities, 2007a: 
6). Another form of vertical integration occurs when the same company benefits from 
both generation/imports and supply interests which in turn “reduces the incentives for 
incumbents to trade on wholesale markets and leads to sub-optimal levels of liquidity in 
these markets” (Commission of the European Communities, 2007a: 6). 
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Obviously, there have been differing opinions over the Commission’s proposal of 
unbundling. The proposal was welcomed by Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Romania and the United Kingdom whereas France, 
Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, Cyprus, Latvia, Luxembourg, and Slovakia opposed 
the proposal. The opposition was led by France and Germany whose gas and electricity 
markets are highly concentrated, and dominated by vertically integrated incumbent 
companies such as GdF and EdF in France, E.ON and RWE in Germany. 
On the other hand, new entrants and customers supported the proposal of 
unbundling since it would help cease the control of incumbent companies over up-stream 
gas imports and/or domestic gas production and decrease their market power by 
separating the transmission and distribution functions of these companies from the 
functions of generation/production and/or supply. New entrants and customers have 
become more concerned when incumbent companies took decisions in favour of their 
own supply businesses and concluded long-term contracts with their retail subsidiaries 
(European Commission, 2007: 210-211). 
As France and Germany, backed by seven other member states, opposed both 
options for unbundling, ‘ownership unbundling’1 and ‘Independent System Operator 
(ISO),’2 they introduced a ‘third way’ option “whereby companies retain full network 
ownership and control, while operations are managed by an Independent Transmission 
Operator (ITO) that would ensure fair network access and push for investments to 
upgrade and expand grids” (Euractiv Website, last accessed on 11 July 2008). 
                                                 
1 Ownership unbundling is the process of separating the transmission and distribution functions of a utility 
from the functions of generation/production and/or supply. 
2 ISO allows the EU member states to maintain ownership of their transmission functions, but leaves the 
management of these functions to an independent body. 
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The European Parliament voted in favour of this third way for EU gas sector 
liberalisation rejecting the ISO option and proposed creating an “independent trustee” 
(Euractiv Website, last accessed on 11 July 2008).3 This supervisory body would 
oversee the internal decisions of the vertically integrated gas companies. On the other 
hand, deal on EU electricity sector liberalisation has not yet been reached. In June, the 
Parliament voted against both the ISO and ITO options and backed UK Socialist MEP 
Eluned Morgan’s draft report favouring ownership unbundling as the only option for EU 
electricity sector liberalisation (Euractiv Website, last accessed on 30 June 2008).4 
So, diverse and plural interests of EU member states on liberalising EU gas and 
electricity markets have an effect on creating a competitive internal energy market and a 
common EU energy policy. The national preferences of member states mainly driven by 
the commercial interests of powerful economic producers, like EdF or GdF in France 
and E.ON or RWE in Germany, affected the outcome on the liberalisation of EU gas and 
electricity sectors. 
How these national preferences are formed will be dealt in detail in Chapter 3 by 
examining five key EU member states namely Germany, the United Kingdom, France, 
Italy, and Austria. The dependency of these countries on energy, their energy 
companies’ dominance in internal energy markets, and relations of these companies with 
the Russian energy company Gazprom will be covered as the major factors leading to 
national preference formation. 
The outcome, driven by these preferences and reached through 
intergovernmental bargaining between EU member states, is the rejection of both 
                                                 
3 579 members of the European Parliament (MEPs) voted in favour with 80 against and 52 abstentions. 
4 449 MEPs were in favour and 204 were against. 
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options for unbundling for the liberalisation of EU gas sector while leaving the 
liberalisation of electricity markets in ambiguity. This outcome demonstrates how EU 
member states’ concern about the distribution of gains from substantive cooperation on 
the Commission’s proposal of unbundling affect their decisions and stance. So, as 
Moravcsik (1998b: 3) also argues, 
The outcomes reflected the relative power of states – more precisely 
patterns of asymmetrical interdependence. Those who gained the most 
economically from integration compromised the most on the margin to 
realize it, whereas those who gained the least or for whom the costs of 
adaptation were highest imposed conditions. 
 
Obviously, EU member states such as Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Romania and the United Kingdom, who would gain the 
most liberalising their both electricity and gas sectors gave their approval for the 
Commission’s proposal on unbundling. On the other hand, France, Germany, Austria, 
Bulgaria, Greece, Cyprus, Latvia, Luxembourg, and Slovakia stayed as opponents. 
Since the energy markets of both Germany and France are highly concentrated 
and dominated by a limited number of energy companies, these EU members would gain 
the least liberalising their both electricity and gas sectors. Therefore, they came up with 
a solution of ‘third way’ instead of accepting the Commission’s proposal on unbundling. 
They ‘imposed’ their own conditions. 
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2.3. The European Union-Russia Dialogue on Energy 
 
 When the USSR collapsed in 1991, the EU, then known as the European 
Community (EC), wanted to initiate energy dialogues with Russia and the former Soviet 
Republics. Therefore, the European Energy Charter was signed in 1991 as the first step 
of an energy dialogue between the East and West. Following the charter, in December 
1994 the Energy Charter Treaty was signed and came into force in April 1998. The 
objectives of this treaty included protection of foreign investment, carrying out the 
energy trade in accordance with the regulations of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), resolution of disputes between participating countries, liberalization of energy 
markets, increase in the efficiency of energy resources, and free transfer of these 
resources. 
 However, although Russia agreed to sign the Energy Charter Treaty in 1994, it 
has not yet ratified it. This creates anxieties in the EU. Furthermore, a series of events 
and ongoing dialogue between the EU and Russia lowered the trust of the EU towards 
Russia and raised concerns over Russia as a reliable partner in energy sector. 
In 1994, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between Russia and 
the EU was signed in order to “set up institutional structures for the establishment of 
cooperation on all subjects of common interest” (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2004: 2). However, this agreement was not sufficient to find solutions for 
the problems related to the energy issue between the EU and Russia. The economic 
interdependence between the EU and Russia strengthened in the light of “the 
development of the internal energy market in Europe, Russia’s bid to join the WTO 
(World Trade Organization), enlargement of the EU by ten Member States, of which 
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eight from Central and Eastern Europe” (Commission of the European Communities, 
2004: 2). So, the inability of the PCA to resolve the energy issues between the EU and 
Russia and the growing economic interdependence between the EU and Russia created a 
need for further cooperation between the EU and Russia, particularly to establish an 
institutionalised relation in terms of agreements and norms to regulate the increasing 
relations in the energy sector. Thus, the EU and the Russian Federation initiated an 
“energy dialogue” in October 2000 when the EU-Russia Summit convened in Paris. 
In this summit, the issues discussed were the security of energy supply to the EU, 
security of infrastructure, protection of foreign investment, implementation of objectives 
of the Kyoto Protocol, and ratification of the Energy Charter Treaty by Russia. The 
former Presidents of Russia, France and the European Commission, Vladimir Putin, 
Jacques Chirac and Romano Prodi, respectively, were present in launching the energy 
dialogue. 
 The energy dialogue between the EU and Russia aimed to improve the 
investment climate in the energy sector, activate the energy trade, and touch upon the 
issues of energy transportation and the environmental impacts of the energy sector. Two 
interlocutors were nominated by Putin and Prodi in order to enhance the energy dialogue 
between the EU and Russia.5 These interlocutors prepare joint progress reports in order 
to inform the EU and Russia about the state of development on issues discussed in the 
EU-Russia Summits. So, these joint progress reports are in a sense guides for the 
resolution of the problems between the EU and Russia on certain issues and for future 
work. 
                                                 
5 These two persons were Victor Khristenko, the Russian Minister of Industry and Energy, and François 
Lamoureux, the Director-General of the Directorate-General for Energy and Transport, representing the 
EU. 
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 Within the framework of the sixth progress report in 2005, the progress achieved 
so far and the work to be done in the future on areas of increased security for suppliers 
and consumers, enhancing the investment climate, the energy dialogue and sustainable 
development, transportation of oil and oil products, the EU-Russia Joint Energy 
Technology Centre, and enhancing co-operation in the field of nuclear energy, were 
discussed (Sixth Progress Report, 2005: 4). The report indicates that the energy dialogue 
between the EU and Russia ensured the security of energy supplies and the mutually 
beneficial cooperation in the energy sector. However, it should be noted that this 
progress report was prepared before the energy crisis between Ukraine and Russia in 
January 2006. 
The report also mentions the importance of long-term gas contracts between the 
EU and Russia, which eliminated the clause indicating that the EU should set a limit of 
30 percent on its energy imports from an external supplier. Similarly, the sixth progress 
report of 2005 states that the EU should eliminate the restrictions on hydrocarbon 
imports into the EU in order to ensure increased security for energy suppliers and 
consumers. 
Furthermore, the report indicates that the EU should address any barriers that 
prevent Russian firms from investing in the EU energy sector in order to enhance the 
investment climate within the EU. According to the report, both the EU and Russia 
recognized “the key energy sectors for investment include enhancing the production at 
existing sites, upgrading the oil refineries, building new and upgrading old power plants 
and developing and upgrading the energy transportation infrastructure” (Sixth Progress 
Report, 2005: 4). 
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Since the Kyoto Protocol entered into force in February 2005, climate-friendly 
investments should be observed. So, both sides agreed to cooperate for energy efficient 
investments. These investments include “projects on ‘Energy Efficiency at a Regional 
Level (Archangelsk, Astrakhan and Kaliningrad)’ and on ‘Renewable Energy Policy and 
Rehabilitation of Small Scale Hydro Power Plants,” (Sixth Progress Report, 2005: 5). 
The transportation of oil and oil products is another subject of concern within the 
framework of the sixth progress report. Both sides recognised the significance of the 
safety and reliability of oil transport in the sense that the transportation of oil and oil 
products may have negative impacts on the environment. For instance, if these products 
are transported by sea routes and if there is leakage of oil, then, marine pollution will be 
inevitable. 
As the sixth progress report indicates, both the EU and Russia agree to enhance 
safety, market opening, fair competition, environmental protection, and the security and 
reliability of the energy transportation networks. The two sides claimed to welcome the 
developments in both natural gas transport infrastructure and oil transport through 
pipelines by emphasising the Yamal-Europe gas pipeline, the North European gas 
pipeline project, the Druzhba and Adria oil pipelines, and the Burgas-Alexandroupolis 
oil pipeline project (Sixth Progress Report, 2005: 6). 
The last subject dealt within the framework of the sixth progress report is the 
cooperation in the field of nuclear energy. Under this heading the EU and Russia desire 
to secure stable, predictable and transparent conditions for the trade in nuclear materials. 
Within this framework, the main objectives of the EU-Russia energy dialogue 
are listed as follows: “to strengthen competition in the internal energy market, to defend 
sustainable development and guarantee external supply security”(Commission of the 
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European Communities, 2004: 6). The following paragraphs assess the extent to which 
these objectives are accomplished. 
 
 
i. Internal energy market 
 
In the internal energy market, the EU aims to introduce necessary directives to 
create clear, predictable and transparent rules for companies to enhance competition. 
The companies that have the ability to compete in the internal energy market, such as 
BP, Shell, TOTAL or ENI, then might be able to invest in Russia. The existence of such 
rules also encourages the Russian firms to invest in the EU. 
The major expected positive impacts of the single market of the EU are that no 
import taxes are put on goods brought in from other member states for personal use; as a 
result of increased competition, wider consumer choice and lower prices are provided; 
and trade barriers are dismantled. 
However, a single energy market has not yet been achieved. For example, some 
of the internal market rules should be examined in order to eliminate the territorial 
restriction clauses, which are contrary to free movement and competition. Then, these 
rules will ensure the security of energy supplies by improving the investment plans and 
infrastructure projects related to the energy sector in the EU. 
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ii. Sustainable development and external supply security 
 
The energy dialogue between the EU and Russia is crucial for the sustainable 
development as well. The insistence of the European Commission on the ratification of 
the Kyoto Protocol by Russia was fruitful. On 22 October 2004, Russia ratified the 
Kyoto Protocol. By the Kyoto Protocol, Russia will use its energy resources more 
efficiently and effectively. Russia will perform reforms regarding “the structure and 
management of natural monopolies, pricing structures and the taxation of natural 
resources” (Commission of the European Communities, 2004: 7). These reforms will 
enhance the economic sectors of Russia as well as the energy sector. Therefore, there 
will be more energy exports to the EU from Russia, which in turn will increase the 
energy transportation between the EU and Russia. 
The growing interdependence between the EU and Russia in the energy sector 
shaped the EU-Russia energy dialogue as a policy tool to ensure stable and predictable 
energy supply. In order to achieve stable and predictable supply, predictable trade rules 
have to be established, networks improved, investments encouraged by promoting a 
more stable and transparent legal framework, and key reforms undertaken in the Russian 
energy sector. The trade in energy products, such as hydrocarbons or nuclear materials, 
should be secured by the establishment of transparent, stable and predictable energy 
trade rules between the EU and Russia. For instance, “Russia made WTO commitments 
related to the price of gas to industrial users and export duties on energy products” 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2004: 9-10). 
Another way to accomplish stable and predictable supply is to develop the Trans-
European energy networks. Energy transport, especially the transport of hydrocarbons 
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coming from Russia, is carried out by land transport or maritime transport systems. 
Because the maritime transport system sometimes gives rise to negative consequences, 
such as maritime accidents leading to oil spill or density of traffic along the coasts, land 
transport gained importance. So, the Trans-European energy networks programme was 
launched in order to execute a number of electricity, gas and oil infrastructure projects. 
Also, energy transport by railroads might take the place of maritime transport reducing 
the risk of environmental pollution. 
 
 
iii. Exchange of technology 
 
The EU-Russia energy dialogue is crucial for the exchange of technology, which 
in turn increases energy efficiency of the Russia’s energy sector. So, for this purpose, to 
increase energy efficiency, joint pilot projects were implemented in Archangelsk, 
Astrakhan and Kaliningrad. 
For Kaliningrad, estimations of energy savings as a result of an energy 
efficiency programme are in the order of 35-40%. This potential is 
significant considering that 90% of the enclave’s primary energy comes 
from Russia (gas pipeline) and 95% of its electricity comes from the 
Russian network IPS/UPOS (Integrated Power System/United Power 
System) (Commission of the European Communities, 2004: 8). 
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These projects are important in the sense that the Baltic States became members 
of the EU and these members will increase the demand of energy and electricity 
supplies. 
 
 
iv. Lessening pollution in energy transport 
 
The energy dialogue between the EU and Russia also aims for a less-polluting 
energy transport system. It aims to enhance the security and increase the effectiveness of 
Russian export networks. In this context, marine pollution is quite important for 
countries bordering the Baltic Sea and the North Sea. Maritime accidents, some resulting 
in the leaking of oil, and the density of maritime traffic along the coasts, led to the 
cooperation of the EU and Russia on the issue of a less-polluting energy transport 
system. The standards of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) are necessary 
to achieve this goal. In addition to maritime transport, land transport, such as rail 
transport or oil pipelines, is under concern in order to reduce the environmental 
pollution. 
 
 
v. Common electricity market 
 
The EU-Russia energy dialogue brought the Russian and the EU energy markets 
together. Even if the two markets are separate, they share the same principles of “energy 
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efficiency, reform of internal industrial structures, reform in the electricity sector and 
unbundling” (Commission of the European Communities, 2004: 11). An interconnected 
electricity network and a common electricity market are required in light of European 
electricity needs. “According to IEA (International Energy Agency) and Eurelectric 
forecasts, between now and 2030, the EU could need to invest in new electricity 
capacities of almost 600GW in order to cover consumer needs.” (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2004: 11) A common electricity market requires a sufficient 
electricity framework in Russia, the adoption of “environmental and safety standards for 
electricity production, such as clean coal combustion rules and the guarantee of nuclear 
safety”, and “the putting in place of necessary infrastructure for the joint use and 
synchronisation of the electricity systems of Russia and of Member States” 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2004: 12). 
 
 
vi. Joint use of satellite navigation systems 
 
The EU and Russia have decided on the joint use of their satellite navigation 
systems, the GALILEO and the GLONASS (Global Navigation Satellite System), 
respectively. The EU aims to use its GALILEO system for civilian and commercial 
applications. Also, Russia plans to open up its GLONASS system for civilian purposes. 
These satellite navigation systems are crucial for the energy sectors of both the EU and 
Russia in the sense that they might be used for exploration, construction, transport and 
site monitoring. The joint use of the GLONASS and the GALILEO will “reinforce the 
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safety of energy transport infrastructures and energy production” (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2004: 12). 
Both the EU and Russia recognise the importance of working together towards a 
strategic EU-Russia energy partnership, given the importance of ensuring adequate 
energy supplies and appropriate energy prices for economic development across the 
whole of the European continent, as well as the long-term nature of investments in 
energy production and transport. 
 
 
2.3.1. The Mechanisms for the Continuing Energy Dialogue 
 
Before the major events that triggered increasing concerns over energy security 
of the EU and its dependency on Russia, particularly in gas, mechanisms have put in 
place for the continuing energy dialogue between the EU and Russia. The energy 
dialogue between the EU and Russia is carried out by (i) interlocutors of both the EU 
and Russia, (ii) organisation of round tables and (iii) support structures, such as the EU-
Russia Permanent Partnership Council, the Cooperation Committee and subcommittees 
dealing with energy issues. 
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2.3.1.1. The role of interlocutors 
 
In order to carry out the energy dialogue between the EU and Russia, regular 
meetings between the interlocutors take place. The two sides regularly meet in order to 
discuss and share opinions about various subjects related to the energy issue, such as 
natural gas and uranium trade or electricity exchanges (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2004: 4). 
 
 
2.3.1.2. Organisation of round tables 
 
In addition to interlocutors’ meetings, round tables are organised on various 
topics of natural gas, electricity and so on. 
For a successful dialogue to be achieved between the EU and Russia, the full 
participation of industrial representatives is needed in the sense that these representatives 
examine common areas of interest and define priority sectors for cooperation such as 
strategies, technology transfer, investments, environmental questions related to the 
energy issue, and energy efficiency (Commission of the European Communities, 2004: 
3). The work of these representatives can be grouped under four themes, related to 
investments, infrastructures, energy efficiency and trade flows. 
Besides these thematic working groups, the EU-Russia Industrialists’ Round 
Table is necessary for the active participation of industrial representatives in the energy 
dialogue between the EU and Russia. The EU-Russia Industrialists’ Round Table of 
 37
December 2003 created the “pilot group on energy” which enabled the participation of 
the companies of both the EU and Russia in the energy dialogue. 
 
 
2.3.1.3. Support structures 
 
There are two basic support structures of the energy dialogue between the EU 
and Russia. One of these structures is the EU-Russia Joint Energy Technology Centre. 
This Centre was established in Moscow on 5 November 2002. The Centre aims to 
advance energy technologies in the sectors of natural gas, electricity, oil, coal, new and 
renewable energy sources and energy savings; and to promote investments in the energy 
sector. 
 The other support structure is the market observatory. This observatory system is 
crucial in the sense that it can monitor whether there are any potential threats against the 
internal and external supplies to the EU or not. It accelerates the construction of 
infrastructures related to the energy sector. It provides data for the member states of the 
EU to implement or carry out their energy policies of new investments in the energy 
sector. 
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2.3.2. Developments Influencing the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue 
 
The aim of the energy dialogue between the European Union and Russia is to 
enhance the energy security of the European continent by improving the relations of 
Russia and the EU on issues of mutual concern in the energy sector and to ensure the 
policies of opening and integrating energy markets are pursued. Regarding the strong 
mutual dependency and common interest in the energy sector, this is clearly a significant 
area of EU-Russia relations. Russia is already the largest single energy partner of the EU 
and is bound to become even more integrated into Europe’s energy market. 
In this respect, Russia already plays a role in the EU internal energy market by 
supplying EU’s energy demand and by taking part in the energy markets of EU member 
states (See Table 4). So, EU expects Russia to fulfil the requirements of “reciprocity in 
market principles, mechanisms and opportunities, as well as equivalent environmental 
standards” (European Commission Website, last accessed on 29 August 2008). 
Accordingly, Russia and the EU are natural partners in the energy sector and EU 
continues to be the dominant market for Russian energy exports (See Table 1 in Chapter 
1). For example, 
Some 63% (130 billion cubic meters (Bcm)) of Russia’s total natural gas 
exports of 205 Bcm were delivered to European countries in the year 2000, 
with contractual requirements to increase deliveries to around 200 Bcm by 
the year 2008. Approximately 56% (73 Bcm) of the natural gas exported to 
Europe in 2000 was delivered to the EU (European Commission Website, 
last accessed on 29 August 2008). 
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Table 4: Main Foreign Entities with Gazprom Group Participation (As of 31 December 
2007) 
 
Country of 
Registration Entity 
Interest, 
% 
Other Shareholders / 
Participants 
Europe    
Austria Gazprom Neft Trading GmbH 100 - 
 ZGG-Zarubezhgazneftekhim Trading GmbH 100 - 
 ZMB Gasspeicher Holding GmbH 67,67 Centrex 
 Gas und Warenhandelsgesellschaft m.b.H. (GWH m.b.H.) 50 
Centrex Gas & Energy 
Europe AG 
 Centrex Beteiligungs GmbH 38 Centrex Gas & Energy Europe AG 
United Kingdom Gazprom Marketing and Trading Ltd. 100 - 
 Gazprom Marketing and Trading Retail Ltd. 100 - 
 Wingas Storage UK Ltd. 33,33 Wingas GmbH, Centrex 
 Interconnector (UK) Ltd. 10 ConocoPhilips, Distrigas, ENI, E.ON Ruhrgas 
Germany Gazprom Germania GmbH 100 - 
 ZMB GmbH 100 - 
 ZMB Mobil GmbH 100 - 
 Wintershall Erdgas Handelshaus GmbH & Co KG (WIEH) 50 Wintershall Holding AG 
 Wintershall Gas GmbH (Wingas GmbH) 49,98 Wintershall Holding AG 
 Wintershall AG 49 Wintershall Holding AG 
 Etzel Kavernenbetriebs-Verwaltungsgesellschaft mbH 33 BP, DONG 
 Etzel Kavernenbetriebsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG 33 BP, DONG 
 VNG AG 5,26 EWE AG, Wintershall Holding AG 
Greece Prometheus Gas S.A. 50 Copelouzos Bros. Corp. 
Italy Gazprom Marketing and Trading Italy, S.r.l. 100 - 
 Promgas SpA 50 ENI 
Netherlands Gazprom Netherlands B.V. 100 - 
 Gazprom Libya B.V. 100 - 
 Blue Stream Pipeline Company B.V. 50 ENI 
Finland Gazum Oy 25 Fortum Corporation, E.ON Ruhrgas, Republic of Finland 
France Gazprom Marketing and Trading France SAS 100 - 
Switzerland ZMB (Schweiz) AG 100 - 
 Baltic LNG AG 80 OAO Sovkomflot 
 Nord Stream AG 51 E.ON Ruhrgas, Wintershall Holding AG 
 Gas Project Development Center Asia AG 50 
Centrex Gas & Energy 
Europe AG 
 Wintershall Erdgas Handelshaus Zug AG (WIEE) 50 Wintershall Holding AG 
 RosUkrEnergo AG 50 Centragas Holding AG 
Bulgaria Topenergy 100 - 
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 Overgas Inc. AD 50 Overgas Holding AG 
 DEXIA-Bulgaria OOD 26 WIEE AG 
Hungary Panrusgaz Rt. 40 E.ON Foldgas Trading Rt. 
Poland STG EuRoPol GAZ S.A. 48 PGNiG S.A., Gas Trading S.A.  
 Gas Trading S.A. 16 PGNiG S.A., Bartimpex S.A., WIEH, Wenglokoks 
Romania WIEE Romania SRL 50 WIEE AG 
 Wirom Gas S.A. 26 WIEE AG, Distrigaz Sud S.A. 
Serbia Yugorosgas 50 Serbiagas, Central ME Energy and Gas 
Turkey Turusgaz 45 
Botas International Ltd., 
Gama Industrial Plants 
Manufacturing and Erection 
Corp. 
 Bosforus Gas Corporation AS 40 Tur Enerji 
Czech Republic Vemex s.r.o. 33 Centrex Gas & Energy Europe AG 
CIS and Baltic States 
Armenia ZAO ArmRosgasprom 53,4 Armenian Ministry of Energy, Itera 
Belarus OAO Beltrangas 12,5 Belarus State Committee for Property 
Kazakhstan TOO KazRosGas 50 NC KazMunayGas 
Moldova AO MoldovaGas 50 Moldova Republic, Transnistria 
Uzbekistan OOO Ustyurt-Zarubezhneftegas 100 - 
 UC Zarubezhneftegas-GPD Central Asia 50 Gas Project Development Center Asia AG 
Ukraine Gastransit 37 NJSC Naftogaz of Ukraine, AO Turusgaz 
Latvia Latvijas Gaze AS 34 Itera-Latvia, E.ON Ruhrgas 
Lithuania ZAO Kaunasskaya power plant 99  
 Lietuvos Dujos AB 37 E.ON Ruhrgas, Lithuanian Republic 
 ZAO Stella Vitae 30 Individuals 
Estonia Eesti Gaas AS 37 E.ON Ruhrgas, Fortum Corporation, Itera-Latvia 
Other Countries / Sites of Registration 
Bermuda Sakhalin Energy Investment Company Ltd. 
50 + one 
share 
Shell Sakhalin Holdings B.V. 
(Shell), Mitsui Sakhalin 
Holdings B.V. (Mitsui), 
Diamond Gas Sakhalin 
(Mitsubishi) 
Venezuela Urdanetgazprom-1, S.A. 99  
 Urdanetgazprom-2, S.A. 99  
Vietnam JOC Vietgazprom 50 NK Petrovietnam 
USA Gazprom Marketing and Trading USA, Inc. 100 - 
 
Source: Gazprom Website, last accessed on 28 August 2008. 
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As the EU and Russia are interdependent in energy sector –the EU is relied upon 
the imports of energy products coming from Russia and Russia still needs the EU since 
it is the major market for Russian energy exports–, developments inciting price hikes or 
speculative fluctuations in energy markets alarmed the EU. Thus, following 
developments in the EU-Russia energy dialogue, namely, the recent energy crisis 
between Ukraine and Russia following the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, Turkmenistan 
increase in the price of natural gas which it sells to Russia, the Sochi Summit of 25 May 
2006 and the Samara Summit of 17-18 May 2007, increased the concerns of the EU 
Commission as well as the member states on energy security. 
One reason that fuels the anxiety of the EU member states stems from 
dependency on Russian gas imports. For instance, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia 
and Finland use only Russian gas in their gross inland energy consumption. Also, the 
share of the Russian gas imports in their total gas imports is 100% (See Table 1 in 
Chapter 1). Also, the use of Russian natural gas in gross inland energy consumption of 
Bulgaria (87.7%), the Czech Republic (75.1%), Greece (82.8%), Hungary (59.5%), 
Austria (68.8%), and Slovenia (59.6%) is all above 50%. (See Table 1 in Chapter 1). In 
addition, the shares of Russian gas imports in total gas imports of three founding states 
of EU, namely Germany, France and Italy, are 41.7%, 19.5% and 31.8% respectively 
(See Table 1 in Chapter 1). The shares of Russian natural gas used in gross inland 
energy consumption of Germany, France and Italy are 37.9%, 19.8% and 27% 
respectively (See Table 1 in Chapter 1). 
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2.3.2.1. Ukraine-Russia Energy Crisis 
 
 The energy crisis of January 2006 broke out between Russia and Ukraine 
because of the unilateral decision of Russia to increase the price of natural gas it exports 
to Ukraine. So, Russia decided to “turn off the pipelines” which export natural gas from 
Russia to Ukraine. This event also clarifies how the issue of energy becomes a powerful 
tool of Russian foreign policy. The energy crisis between Russia and Ukraine not only 
strained the relations between those two countries, but also those between Russia and the 
EU. The policy of “turning off the pipelines” against Ukraine meant cold and dark days 
for the EU, which is dependent on the Russian natural gas exports. After the energy 
crisis, the EU has taken more seriously the task of establishing a common energy policy, 
as the EU energy policy process has been described in the previous section. 
 
 
2.3.2.2. The Critical Role of Turkmen Gas Supply 
 
 In June 2006, Turkmenistan declared that it would increase the price of natural 
gas, which it sells to Russia. This raised the question of whether there would be new 
energy crisis between Russia and Ukraine because the rising anxiety was due to an 
increase in the price of Turkmen gas, which in turn might lead to another price hike for 
Ukraine, given that Turkmen natural gas exported through Gazprom’s pipeline network 
goes to Ukraine. Thus, another potential energy crisis between Russia and Ukraine 
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alarmed the EU and the EU directed itself to diversify its energy resources and routes to 
decrease its dependency on Russia. 
 
 
2.3.2.3. The Sochi Summit 
 
 An important milestone of the EU-Russia energy dialogue is the Sochi Summit 
convened in 25 May 2006 in Sochi. The main subject of the summit was to achieve the 
ratification of the Energy Charter Treaty by Russia, so that the EU will put an end to 
Gazprom’s monopoly on Central Asian natural gas exports. However, Russia again 
refused to ratify the treaty. On the contrary, the awaited decision from the summit for 
Russia was that there would be no interference in Gazprom’s activities to take part in 
European energy markets. 
 
 
2.3.2.4. The Samara Summit 
 
The EU-Russia summit was convened in Volzhsky Utyos, Samara region of 
Russia on 17-18 May 2007, with the participation of the President of the European 
Commission José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Council, Chancellor of 
Germany Angela Merkel, and the former President of Russia Vladimir Putin. The other 
participants were the Commissioner for External Relations and European 
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Neighbourhood Policy Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister 
of Germany Frank-Walter Steinmeier, and the Russian Government Ministers including 
current Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov. The importance of this summit relates 
to the topics covered, preparations for a new EU-Russia agreement to replace the current 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1994, state of progress in Russia’s WTO 
accession, energy cooperation and better exchange of information on possible problems 
in connection with the supplies of gas and oil, implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and 
the preparations for post-2012 climate change negotiations, and enhanced cooperation in 
the science and education fields. 
 To sum up, even if the energy dialogue between the EU-Russia seems as if it is a 
monologue in which Russia has more energy leverage, the EU is now trying to transform 
this into a real dialogue by increasing its leverage as well by implementing certain 
energy projects like the Nabucco Natural Gas Pipeline Project and the Turkey-Greece-
Italy Natural Gas Pipeline Project. While the EU is dependent on energy supplies from 
Russia, Russia also needs the high technology and capital from the EU. So, in order to 
fulfil the concept of ‘dialogue’, both the EU and Russia need to undertake their 
obligations and sometimes compromise from national policies. 
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2.4. Major Natural Gas Pipelines between Europe and Russia 
 
Figure 2: Map of Major Natural Gas Pipelines between Europe and Russia 
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2.4.1. Existing Pipelines 
 
 
2.4.1.1. Yamal-Europe I 
 
The Yamal-Europe pipeline is 4196 kilometres in length of whose 2932 
kilometres pass through Russia, approximately 575 kilometres through Belarus and 680 
kilometres through Poland. The JAGAL pipeline connecting the gas system in Germany 
to the Yamal-Europe pipeline is around 1695 kilometres (EuRoPol GAZ Website, last 
accessed on 12 June 2008). 
The Yamal-Europe pipeline carries natural gas supplied from the gas fields in the 
Nadym Pur Taz District of the Tyumen Region on the Yamal peninsula, Russia to 
Germany across Belarus and Poland (EuRoPol GAZ Website, last accessed on 12 June 
2008). 
In 1993, Russia, Belarus and Poland signed the Intergovernmental Agreements to 
initiate the Yamal-Europe natural gas pipeline project. In 1994, the construction of the 
German section of the pipeline started by the efforts of WINGAS, a joint venture of 
Russian company Gazprom and German company Wintershall. In 1997, the first flow of 
natural gas to Germany via the Belarus-Polish corridor was realised. The Belarussian 
and Polish sections of the Yamal-Europe pipeline were commissioned in 1999. 
Eventually, in 2005, when all the compressor stations were built, the flow of natural gas 
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from the Yamal-Europe pipeline reached its designed capacity of 33 bcm per year 
(EuRoPol GAZ Website, last accessed on 12 June 2008). 
The Russian company Gazprom owns and operates both the Russian and 
Belarussian sections of the pipeline. The Polish company EuRoPol GAZ S.A. is the 
owner and operator of the Polish section of the pipeline.6 
 
 
2.4.2. Proposed Pipelines 
 
 
2.4.2.1. Nord Stream 
 
Nord Stream is planned to carry 55 bcm of natural gas when its construction is 
finalised in 2011. The construction of Nord Stream will be realised in two phases in 
which the first pipeline built in the first phase will be followed by a second pipeline each 
having a transport capacity of 27.5 bcm per year. The latter pipelines is planned to be 
commissioned in 2012 for the flow of natural gas (Nord Stream Gas Pipeline Project 
Website, last accessed on 12 June 2008). 
                                                 
6 EuRoPol GAZ S.A. is a joint venture of the Polish company PGNiG, the Russian company Gazprom and 
Polish Gas Trading S.A. having shares of 48%, 48% and 4% respectively. 
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Nord Stream will have 1220 kilometres long offshore section as well as on-shore 
connections in both Russia and Germany, 917 kilometres and 850 kilometres 
respectively. The on-shore section in Russia aims to connect the pipeline to the Russian 
gas transmission system. In Germany, two on-shore connections will be built by 
WINGAS, a joint venture of Wintershall Holding and Gazprom, and E.ON Ruhrgas 
from Greifswald to the south and west of Germany (Nord Stream Gas Pipeline Project 
Website, last accessed on 12 June 2008). 
 
Figure 3: Map of Nord Stream Pipeline 
 
 
Source: Gazprom Website, last accessed on 12 June 2008. 
 
The Nord Stream natural gas pipeline project plans to carry Russian natural gas 
from its Yuzhno-Russkoye oil and gas reserves, Yamal Peninsula, Ob-Taz bay and 
Shtokmanovskoye fields via the Baltic Sea from Portovaya Bay near Vyborg, Russia to 
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the Baltic coast of Germany, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania near Greifswald. 
Together with Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and 
France are the other target markets for the Russian natural gas suppliers through Nord 
Stream (Gazprom Website, last accessed on 12 June 2008). 
First step was taken by Russian company Gazprom and German companies, 
BASF AG and E.ON AG to construct the Nord Stream natural gas pipeline by 
concluding an in-principle Agreement on 8 September 2005 in Berlin. According to this 
agreement, a joint venture Nord Stream AG was to be established, Gazprom, Wintershall 
Holding (BASF AG subsidiary), E.ON Ruhrgas (Ruhrgas AG before 1 July 2004; 
starting from February 2003 is part of E.ON) having 51%, 24.5%, and 24.5% shares 
respectively (Gazprom Website, last accessed on 12 June 2008). 
Following this step, Gazprom and Dutch company N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie 
signed an Umbrella Agreement on 6 November 2007 which made the Dutch company 
the fourth partner of Nord Stream AG with 9% share. So, recent distribution of shares in 
Nord Stream AG is 51% (Gazprom), 20% (Wintershall Holding), 20% (E.ON Ruhrgas), 
and 9% (N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie) (Gazprom Website, last accessed on 12 June 2008). 
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2.4.2.2. South Stream 
 
Figure 4: Map of South Stream Pipeline 
 
 
Source: Gazprom Website, last accessed on 12 June 2008. 
South Stream is another project foreseen by Gazprom to export natural gas to 
Europe without relying on third parties. The project aims to carry Russian natural gas 
under the Black Sea from the Beregovaya compressor station in the Russian coast to 
Bulgarian coast (Gazprom Website, last accessed on 12 June 2008). 
The offshore section of the South Stream project, which is to be commissioned in 
2013, will approximately be 900 kilometres in length and have a full capacity of 30 bcm 
per year. Currently, two different routes, north-westwards to Hungary reaching Austria 
(1300 kilometres) and south-westwards to Greece extending to Otranto in Italy (1000 
kilometres), are under consideration of how Russian natural gas will be distributed to 
Europe from the Bulgarian onshore section of South Stream (Crooks, 24 June 2007). 
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Bilateral dialogue commenced between Gazprom and ENI on 23 June 2007 by 
signing of a Memorandum of Understanding to implement the South Stream project led 
to the foundation of the South Stream AG Special Purpose Entity on 18 January 2008 
both companies having equal shares (Gazprom Website, last accessed on 12 June 2008). 
 
 
2.4.2.3. Yamal-Europe II 
 
The Yamal-Europe II pipeline project, expected to be realised by 2010, aims to 
double the capacity of the Yamal-Europe I pipeline, carrying Russian natural gas to 
Germany across Belarus and Poland, to 66 bcm per year (EIA, 2008: 12). 
The Russian company Gazprom and Poland cannot reach an agreement on the 
route of the proposed pipeline since Gazprom’s choice is the pipeline passing through 
south-eastern Poland to Slovakia and then to Central Europe. On the contrary, Poland 
prefers the route travelling via its territory to Germany (EIA, 2008: 12). 
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 CHAPTER 3 
 
CASES: CREATING A COMMON EU ENERGY POLICY 
 
 
This chapter will cover the energy outlooks of Germany, the United Kingdom, 
France, Italy and Austria since they are the major countries leading the deepening and 
enlargement issues of the EU integration process. Thus, their position regarding 
common energy policy can shed a light on the challenges to create internal energy 
market and a common energy policy given their different levels of energy dependency. 
Then, it attempts to assess whether these countries’ bilateral relations with Russia in 
energy affect the EU policy making process in achieving a common energy policy. 
Lastly, it will address the question of how these countries pursue their bilateral relations 
with the Russian Federation in supplying their energy need. 
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3.1. Germany 
 
 
3.1.1. The Energy Outlook of Germany 
 
 Germany is one of the member states whose energy import dependency exceeds 
the EU-average of 50.1% with 62%. Germany is the top oil and natural gas importer 
within the Union. Germany imports 112 Mt (2005) of oil and 94 Mm3 (2006) of natural 
gas (IEA Website, last accessed on 12 June 2008). Imported oil comes from both Russia 
and Norway; in addition, together with the Netherlands these two countries meet the 
natural gas need of Germany. There are five wholesale gas companies dominating the 
German gas industry, namely, E.ON-Ruhrgas, RWE, VNG, Wingas and BEB (European 
Commission, Germany Internal Market Fact Sheet, 2007: 1). 
 
 
3.1.2. Germany: Converging or Diverging Interests with the EU? 
 
 The largest wholesale company of the German gas industry E.ON-Ruhrgas has a 
60% share in the wholesale market as well as 30% in the regional distribution 
companies. Since there are long-term contracts finalised between the suppliers and 
distributors, there is no room left for new entrants in the market (European Commission, 
Germany Internal Market Fact Sheet, 2007: 1). This non-competitiveness in one of the 
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founding states of the EU contradicts with “competitiveness”, one of the three major 
goals of European energy policy outlined in The Green Paper of 2006 of the 
Commission. 
Both the ‘ownership unbundling’ and ‘Independent System Operator (ISO)’ 
options proposed by the Commission in order to secure competition in energy markets of 
member states was not welcomed by Germany (Euractiv Website, last accessed on 6 
May 2008). Together with France, Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, Cyprus, Luxembourg, 
Latvia and Slovakia, Germany strongly opposed the Commission’s proposal of 
ownership unbundling because this meant breaking up of the shares of large energy 
companies in energy sector such as E.ON and RWE of Germany (Laitner and Parker, 
2006). 
Along with competitiveness, security of supply is also perceived necessary to 
create an energy policy among the EU member states as introduced in The Green Paper 
of 2006. The goal of securing supply is to tackle the dependency of EU on imports of 
natural resources. In the following section, whether Germany is on the path of achieving 
this goal or not will be discussed in detail. 
 
 
3.1.3. Germany-Russia Relations in Energy 
 
The Nord Stream Project, previously named in 2005 the North European Natural 
Gas Pipeline Project, which is undertaken by the Russian natural gas company, 
Gazprom, the German companies BASF AG and E.ON AG, and the Dutch company 
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N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie is an important project that will increase dependency of 
Germany on Russia as well as strengthening Russia’s dominance in the EU energy 
market (Nord Stream Website, last accessed on 12 June 2008). The designed capacity of 
the pipeline, which is to be completed by 2011, is 55 bcm per year. With this project, the 
Russian natural gas will be transferred to Germany under the Baltic Sea. Gazprom has a 
share of 51% in this project whereas the other two German companies had to split the 
rest 40% evenly among themselves since N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie has a stake of 9% 
(Nord Stream Website, last accessed on 12 June 2008). 
The Nord Stream Project provided two significant advantages for Russia. Firstly, 
the project will secure the EU energy market since the members of the EU, namely 
Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and France will 
become more dependent on the energy resources of Russia with the initiation of this 
project. Secondly, the project will not rely on third parties, by other terms it will bypass 
Poland and the Baltic States which in turn will reduce the political risks and costs of 
transmitting gas and strengthen the role of Russia as a reliable energy supplier (Gazprom 
Website, last accessed on 12 June 2008). 
So, since Germany has high level of energy import dependency, 62%, and it 
depends on Russian gas imports, constituting 41.7% of its total gas imports (See Table 1 
in Chapter 1), Germany’s dominant energy company in gas industry, E.ON Ruhrgas7, 
does not hesitate to form bilateral relations with the Russian company Gazprom to 
secure Germany’s gas imports from Russia by agreeing on the Nord Stream Pipeline 
project. All these factors have an effect on Germany’s national preference formation 
                                                 
7 RWE, VNG, Wingas and BEB are the other wholesale gas companies dominating the German gas 
industry. 
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which in turn determines its stance on creating a common EU energy policy. These 
factors led Germany to oppose the Commission’s proposal of unbundling vertically 
integrated incumbent energy companies in order to liberalise EU energy markets and to 
create a competitive internal energy market under the provisions of The Green Paper of 
2006. Since this proposal directly targets E.ON and RWE in Germany, Germany is one 
of the leading opponents together with France, Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, Cyprus, 
Latvia, Luxembourg, and Slovakia. 
 
 
3.2. The United Kingdom 
 
 
3.2.1. The Energy Outlook of The United Kingdom 
 
The United Kingdom is not as dependent on energy imports as Germany. Taking 
into consideration the EU-27 average energy import dependency of 50.1%, the UK is far 
under this percentage with 5.2% in 2004 and increasing to 14% in 2005 (European 
Commission, United Kingdom Energy Mix Fact Sheet, 2007: 2). The reasons behind this 
rise in the percentage of energy import dependency are the decrease in North Sea energy 
production in the face of an increase in domestic demand. Therefore, for the first time in 
2004 since 1991, the UK became a net importer of energy resources (IEA, last accessed 
on 12 June 2008). These imports of natural gas and oil mostly come from Norway. Still, 
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the UK is the top producer of oil and natural gas in the EU (European Commission, 
United Kingdom Energy Mix Fact Sheet, 2007: 2). 
 
 
3.2.2. The United Kingdom: Converging or Diverging Interests with 
the EU? 
 
The United Kingdom has the most competitive energy market with respect to the 
energy markets of countries examined in this thesis, namely Germany, France, Italy and 
Austria. Both wholesale and retail markets of the UK are competitive in the sense that 
gas and electricity transmission companies are fully ownership unbundled whereas there 
are still vertically integrated companies retaining some distribution systems (Ipek and 
Williams, 2008: 18). The six major electricity companies control the British downstream 
gas market together with the French company GdF and multinational companies like BP, 
TOTAL and Shell (European Commission, United Kingdom Internal Market Fact Sheet, 
2007). 
Taking into consideration the competitive British energy market, the UK strongly 
supports unbundling vertically integrated companies in both gas and electricity markets 
in the EU member states. Under this provision, the UK, together with seven other EU 
member states, namely Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Finland and Romania, 
supported Denmark’s energy minister calling upon Andris Piebalgs, the energy 
commissioner, and Neelie Kroes, European Commissioner for Competition that they 
back unbundling vertically integrated companies such as E.ON (Germany), EdF 
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(France), and ENI (Italy) to create a competitive European energy market (Crooks and 
Laitner, 2007). 
The next section about the relations between the UK and Russia in energy will 
try to assess whether the UK fulfils its responsibilities as an EU member state to create a 
common external energy policy in terms of securing supply, and how if it fulfils them. 
 
 
3.2.3. The United Kingdom-Russia Relations in Energy 
 
The United Kingdom is one of the EU members Russia has an energy related 
bilateral dialogue with. The developments related to energy issues between the UK and 
Russia are Gazprom’s bid to join the downstream gas transport and retail markets of the 
UK and the sale of British assets in TNK-BP, British-Russian joint venture, to Gazprom, 
state-controlled gas company of Russia. 
Russia announced its aim to take part in the national energy market of the UK by 
seizing the British natural gas distribution company, Centrica (Warner, 2006). However, 
Alexander Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of Gazprom’s Management Committee, then 
negated this aim since no talks were carried on with Centrica reserving the option of 
joining the downstream gas transport and retail markets of the UK (Martinson, 2007). 
However, Russia took part in the energy market of the UK by purchasing the two 
commercial and industrial companies of the UK. The acquisitions of Pennine Gas in 
June 2006 and Natural Gas Shipping Services in 2007, together having less than 1% 
share in the gas retail market of the UK, by Gazprom clearly demonstrates to what 
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extent Russia can be serious about joining the UK energy market (Adetunji, 2006 and 
Crooks, 29 June 2007).  
The sale of British assets in TNK-BP, British-Russian joint venture, to Gazprom, 
state-controlled gas company of Russia is another significant event in order to 
understand how the relations between the UK and Russia has developed over time.  
Under the leadership of BP’s former chief executive Lord Browne, BP made an 
investment of $8 billion (£4 billion) in the Russian oil and gas industry (O’Connell, 
2007). TNK-BP together with Potanin’s Interros, having 62.8% and 37.2% shares 
respectively, were the shareholders of Russia Petroleum which holds the license to 
develop the Kovytka gas field in the Irkutsk region in Russia (Olcott, 2004: 26; 
O’Connell, 2007). The Kovytka gas field, having an estimated volume of 2000 bcm gas 
and 83 mt of gas condensate, is expected to be in full production in 2015 (O’Connell, 
2007). 
Russia’s strategy of ‘state control’ to run the energy sector in the country shaped 
the course of the sale of British assets in TNK-BP to the Russian company Gazprom in 
June 2007 (Balzer, 2005: 218; Olcott, 2004: 26). An interview between Craig Murphy 
and Sergei Kuprianov, press spokesman for the former chairman and the current 
President of Russia of Gazprom, Dimitri Medvedev, clearly illustrates how Russia 
approaches foreign investment in Russia. Upon a question of Murphy (2007) whether 
foreign investors are no longer welcome in Russia Kuprianov stated, “Russia no longer 
needs any foreign investment. Back in the Nineties we lacked capital and expertise. Now 
we have plenty of both”. 
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Russia’s claim that the British-Russian joint venture TNK-BP has produced only 
less than 2.5 bcm of gas per year instead of targeted annual amount of 9 bcm of gas 
(O’Connell, 2007), has led BP and TNK-BP to sell its assets in Russia Petroleum to 
Gazprom in 2007 (Kramer, 2007). 
The sale of British assets in TNK-BP to Russian Gazprom is not the first incident 
Russia has taken hold of foreign companies’ stakes. Royal Dutch Shell also sold its 
assets in the Sakhalin II oil and gas project to Gazprom. The energy experts interpreted 
the sale of assets of Shell as a forced bargain, raising concerns about foreign investment 
in Russia (Kramer, 2007). 
Thus, the significance of the case of TNK-BP is that it clearly demonstrates how 
Russia approaches foreign energy companies, which want to do business in Russian 
territory. 
So, factors such as the United Kingdom’s low level of energy import 
dependency, 14%, compared to EU-27 average of 50.1%, its highly competitive energy 
market, and its being not solely dependent of Russian gas imports, shapes its national 
preferences accordingly and determines its position pursuant to the requirements to 
achieve a competitive internal energy market and a common EU energy policy. That is 
why the United Kingdom strongly supports the Commission’s proposal of unbundling 
vertically integrated companies together with Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, 
Finland, Romania, and Denmark. 
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3.3. France 
 
 
3.3.1. The Energy Outlook of France 
 
 The significant aspect of France’s energy supply is that it is the largest producer 
of nuclear energy, which supplies 40% of its energy need from and uses for electricity 
generation, in the EU. Nevertheless, France also imports oil and natural gas. Its energy 
import dependency ratio is 52% closer to the EU average of 50.1%. It imports 84 Mt of 
oil from Norway, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Kazakhstan, Iran, Algeria and Libya, and 45 
Mm3 of natural gas from Norway, Russia, Algeria, Nigeria and Egypt. As indicated in 
the Internal Market Fact Sheet of France of the European Commission (2007: 1), “the 
gas industry in France is dominated by Gaz de France (GdF) which directly or indirectly 
operates at all market levels – imports/wholesale, transmission and distribution, and 
supply”. 
 
 
3.3.2. France: Converging or Diverging Interests with the EU? 
 
 The electricity and gas energy markets of France are highly concentrated with a 
small number of companies controlling these markets. The transmission system 
operators (TSO) in both markets are unbundled, but still vertically integrated companies 
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own these operators, and distribution companies were unbundled in July 2007 (European 
Commission, France Internal Market Fact Sheet, 2007: 1). 
Within the electricity market, EdF, which owns the TSO and DSO (Distribution 
System Operator) supplying 95% of customer needs, is the dominant company with 87% 
of electricity generation capacity along with Electrabel-Suez and SNET, having 4% and 
2% of production capacity respectively (European Commission, France Internal Market 
Fact Sheet, 2007: 1). 
The gas market, on the other hand, is dominated by GdF. GdF and TOTAL, 
holding 95% of gas imports, are the two major companies which supply gas to the 
French gas market (European Commission, France Internal Market Fact Sheet, 2007: 1). 
Two TSOs in France are controlled by GdF and TOTAL, having 88% and 12% shares 
respectively whereas GdF dominates the distribution level of the gas market with a share 
of 96% (European Commission, France Internal Market Fact Sheet, 2007: 1). 
Taking into account the above figures in French energy market, it will be naïve 
to believe that France is a strong supporter of a competitive internal energy market 
which is a major goal of the EU outlined in The Green Paper of 2006. France is one of 
the nine countries, Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Latvia 
and Slovakia, which opposes the proposal of the Commission to unbundle the vertically 
integrated companies in EU member states or to give the management of these 
companies’ transmission functions to an Independent System Operator to ensure the 
liberalisation of EU gas and electricity markets (Euractiv Website, last accessed on 6 
May 2008). 
Therefore, France and Germany proposed an alternative option, “third way,” 
which will ensure E.ON’s and EdF’s ownership of their assets. However, according to 
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Euractiv news (Euractiv Website, last accessed on 6 May 2008), an independent body, 
the Independent Transmission Operator (ITO) would manage these assets by 
… adopting its annual investment plan and raising money on the capital 
market, in particular through borrowing and capital increase. Every year, 
the TSO would be required to submit a ten-year investment plan to the 
energy regulator at national level, based on existing supply and demand 
forecasts. 
 
A supervisory body, an international trustee, will be responsible for taking the 
decisions, which may affect the value of the assets of the vertically integrated company 
(Euractiv Website, last accessed on 6 May 2008). Only one member of this body, who 
will have “a veto right with respect to decisions that in his view may significantly reduce 
the asset value of the transmission system operator,” will be appointed by the EU 
member states and the rest will be selected among candidates having no relations with 
the vertically integrated company for at least five years prior to his appointment for the 
position (Euractiv Website, last accessed on 6 May 2008). 
The following section will examine how the relations between France and Russia 
in energy augment the reluctance of France in achieving a common energy policy.  
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3.3.3. France-Russia Relations in Energy 
 
France made a deal with Russia on 13 July 2007 in which the Russian gas 
company Gazprom and the French oil and gas company TOTAL agreed to cooperate in 
developing the Shtokman gas field in the Barents Sea (Noel, 2007). The Nord Stream is 
the project, which will undertake this task. It will carry Russian natural gas from 
Shtokman fields to France as well as Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium and 
the United Kingdom. 
 Given the expropriation of a large gas field, Kovytka, operated by the British-
Russian joint venture TNK-BP and of Sakhalin II oil and gas project undertaken by 
Royal Dutch Shell, the deal between a multinational company TOTAL and a state-
controlled gas company Gazprom is a significant achievement in terms of foreign 
investment in Russia (Noel, 2007). That is because Vladimir Putin, the former President 
of Russia, preferred state regulation on natural resource use and asserted that this sector 
is “beyond the capacity of market mechanisms” (Balzer, 2005: 218, Olcott, 2004: 21).  
A significant point in the Shtokman deal between TOTAL and Gazprom is that it 
demonstrates the vulnerability of the Russian government and Gazprom in the sense that 
Russia needs a foreign partner, in this case TOTAL, to develop the Shtokman fields in 
its territory since it cannot achieve this task on its own (Noel, 2007). 
So, France, being dependent on energy imports by 52%, relying on Russian gas 
imports, which constitute 19.5% of its total gas imports (See Table 1 in Chapter 1), and 
having highly concentrated electricity and gas sectors, does not seem to be a strong 
supporter of a competitive internal energy market and a common EU energy policy. As 
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EdF and GdF, which are the two dominant companies in France’s electricity and gas 
markets, are targets of the Commission’s proposal of unbundling vertically integrated 
companies, these two are the major players in France’s decision on opposing 
unbundling. That is why France together with Germany proposed an alternative option, 
‘third way,’ which would ensure full ownership of these two vertically integrated 
companies on their assets. Thus, national preferences of France, driven by the 
“commercial interests of powerful economic producers,” like EdF and GdF, directly 
affected France’s divergent stance on achieving a competitive internal energy market 
and a common EU energy policy (Moravcsik, 1998b: 3). 
 
 
3.4. Italy 
 
 
3.4.1. The Energy Outlook of Italy 
 
 Italy is one of the EU member states that has a very high dependency of 84% on 
oil and natural gas imports with respect to the EU average of 50.1%. 95 Mt of oil and 77 
Mm3 of natural gas are imported in Italy (IEA Website, last accessed on 12 June 2008). 
Imported oil is from Libya, Russia and Saudi Arabia. It is dependent on Russia, Algeria 
and Norway for natural gas imports. The Italian company ENI dominates the gas 
industry in Italy having shares of 84%, 62% and 44% in domestic production of energy, 
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imports of natural resources and retail activity respectively (European Commission, Italy 
Internal Market Fact, 2007: 1). 
 
 
3.4.2. Italy: Converging or Diverging Interests with the EU? 
 
 The Italian energy market is highly concentrated, however, in electricity market 
the level of concentration decreased when Enel, a major company in electricity market 
previously owned by state, was split between the Italian Economy and Finance Ministry 
(21.1%), Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (10.1%), institutional investors (34.3%) and retail 
investors (34.5%) (Enel Website, last accessed on 12 June 2008). 
 The electricity market of Italy is dominated by Enel (39%) followed by Edison 
(12.1%), Edipower (9%), Endesa Italia (7.4%), ENI (6%) and other small enterprises 
having less than 2.5% shares (European Commission, Italy Internal Market Fact Sheet, 
2007: 1). The retail market of Italy is divided between the free market and the regulated 
market whose 85.5% of its supplies are met by Enel Distribuzione (European 
Commission, Italy Internal Market Fact Sheet, 2007: 1). 
 ENI is the dominant actor in the Italian gas industry. 84% of domestic 
production, 62% of imports and 44% of retail activities are controlled by ENI (European 
Commission, Italy Internal Market Fact Sheet, 2007: 1). The owner and operator of 
transport pipelines in Italy is SnamReteGas and of most storage facilities is Snogit, in 
which ENI has 50% and 100% shares respectively (European Commission, Italy Internal 
Market Fact Sheet, 2007: 1). The Italian retail gas market is under control of three major 
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companies, ENI has a share of 44%, ENEL has 15% of shares and Edison has 8% 
whereas there are about 430 operators in the distribution network, in which Italgas, 
owned completely by ENI, being the largest company with a share of 32% (European 
Commission, Italy Internal Market Fact Sheet, 2007: 1). 
 The major Italian companies such as ENI, SnamReteGas and Enel have not been 
in favour of fragmented energy market in Italy, entrance of new entrants in the market or 
improvement of infrastructure for energy trading since all these may challenge the 
interests of these companies (Ipek and Williams, 2008: 10). 
 Regarding the high level of dependency of 84% on oil and gas imports, the 
reluctance of major Italian companies for a competitive energy market in Italy and the 
bilateral relations between Italy and Russia in energy, which will be discussed in the 
following section, will pave the way for a better understanding of Italy’s reluctance to 
act in accordance with the efforts of the European Commission to achieve a common 
internal energy market and a common external energy policy in the EU. 
 
 
3.4.3. Italy-Russia Relations in Energy 
 
The Blue Stream natural gas pipeline having an annual designed capacity of 16 
bcm and total length of 1213 kilometres (EIA, 2008: 13) is one of the projects along 
with the South Stream project that strengthens the relations between Italy and Russia in 
energy. Blue Stream, aiming to supply Russian natural gas directly to Turkey through 
the Black Sea without relying on third parties for transmission, is owned by an equal 
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partnership between the Russian company Gazprom and the Italian company ENI, 
namely Blue Stream Pipeline B.V. Company (BSPC) (ENI Website, last accessed on 12 
June 2008).  
The BSPC was founded in November 1999 following the Memorandum of 
Understanding signed between Gazprom and ENI in February 1999 to implement the 
Blue Stream project (Gazprom Website, last accessed on 12 June 2008). The BSPC now 
only owns the offshore section of Blue Stream whereas the Russian company Gazprom 
owns and operates the onshore section of the pipeline (Gazprom Website, last accessed 
on 12 June 2008). Saipem, given the right to undertake the project by the BSPC in 
November 1999, implemented the construction of the Blue Stream project in February 
2000 and in November 2005; Blue Stream was officially inaugurated in Turkey 
(Gazprom Website, last accessed on 12 June 2008).  
 The relations between Italy and Russia in energy increased progressively when 
the Russian company Gazprom and the Italian company ENI signed on 23 June 2007 a 
Memorandum of Understanding to implement the South Stream project. Following this 
initiative, South Stream AG Special Purpose Entity where both companies having equal 
shares was founded on 18 January 2008 (Gazprom Website, last accessed on 12 June 
2008). 
The South Stream project, with an annual designed capacity of 30 bcm to be 
commissioned in 2013, aims to carry Russian natural gas under the Black Sea to 
Bulgaria from where it would follow either northwest or southwest route or both 
(Gazprom Website, last accessed on 12 June 2008). The total length of the South Stream 
project is foreseen as 3200 kilometres, if both routes are considered, 900 kilometres of 
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offshore section passing from the Beregovaya compressor station in the Russian coast to 
Bulgarian coast, 1300 kilometres passing through Hungary to Austria, and 1000 
kilometres extending to Greece to reach Italy in the end (Crooks, 24 June 2007). 
Alexander Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of Gazprom’s Management Committee, 
described “the memorandum as part of Gazprom’s strategy aimed at ‘diversifying 
Russian gas supply routes toward European countries and at significantly contributing to 
Europe’s energy security’” (Crooks, 24 June 2007). So, the South Stream project will 
strengthen Gazprom’s strategy of building pipelines to secure the EU energy markets for 
Russian gas supplies without relying on third parties since the project will bypass 
Turkey, which in turn will reduce the transmission costs and political risks. 
So, Italy’s high level of energy import dependency, 84%, its dependency on 
Russian gas imports, constituting 31.8% of its total gas imports (See Table 1 in Chapter 
1), and its highly concentrated gas markets dominated by ENI having strong ties with the 
Russian company Gazprom, are the major determinants of Italy’s national preferences 
on creating a competitive internal energy market and achieving a common EU energy 
policy. Since the vertically integrated Italian gas company ENI has opposed the full 
liberalisation of gas markets, this had lessened Italy’s support for a competitive internal 
energy market. In addition, since Italy is dependent on energy imports, the dominant 
company in Italian gas sector, ENI, pursues bilateral talks with the Russian company 
Gazprom in order to secure Russian gas imports by agreeing on the South Stream 
Pipeline project. This in turn leads to Italy’s tenuous support for a common EU energy 
policy. 
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3.5. Austria 
 
 
3.5.1. The Energy Outlook of Austria 
 
 Austria having an energy import dependency of 70.8% is far from the EU 
average of 50.1% (European Commission, Austria Energy Mix Fact Sheet, 2007: 1). 
Saudi Arabia, Libya, Kazakhstan and Russia are the major countries importing oil to 
Austria. For natural gas, Austria is dependent on Russian gas imports. Apart from oil 
and natural gas, renewable sources have a significant level of 21% in the energy supply 
of Austria when compared to the EU average of 6% (European Commission, Austria 
Energy Mix Fact Sheet, 2007: 1). Austria, being a major transit country for gas 
transmissions, only consumes one fourth of gas carried via Austria. Another significant 
feature of gas industry in Austria is that it is divided into three “control areas”, two of 
which are connected to the gas network of Germany (European Commission, Austria 
Internal Market Fact Sheet, 2007: 1). As indicated in the Internal Market Fact Sheet of 
Austria of the European Commission (2007: 1), 
Gas wholesaling takes place at two levels: foreign and domestic producers 
supply the Austrian first-level wholesalers who then pass on these 
deliveries to distributors and traders in the second-level wholesale market. 
The large distributors also supply the bulk of both small and large end-
users. Currently, no gas supplier is independent from local players 
(emphasise added). 
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3.5.2. Austria: Converging or Diverging Interests with the EU? 
 
 The electricity market of Austria is controlled mostly by publicly owned 
companies of federal and provincial governments or municipal councils (European 
Commission, Austria Internal Market Fact Sheet, 2007: 1). Both distribution and retail 
network is highly concentrated in Austria where the largest companies of electricity 
industry integrated their facilities of retail marketing and trading (European 
Commission, Austria Internal Market Fact Sheet, 2007: 1). 
 Therefore, Austria supported France and Germany’s rejection of the European 
Commission’s proposals of unbundling or Independent System Operator with Bulgaria, 
Greece, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Latvia and Slovakia. Following Italy, Austria, has the 
highest dependency ratio of 70.8% on oil and gas imports, especially from Russia. So, 
Austria has to have strong relations with Russia to secure its imports. The next section 
will examine these relations in detail to better understand the Austria’s relatively little 
support for a competitive and liberal internal energy market and a common external 
energy policy of the EU. 
 
 
3.5.3. Austria-Russia Relations in Energy 
 
Unlike Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy, Austria preferred to 
follow a different strategy with Russia. Instead of making investments in building 
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pipelines with Russia, Austria is trying to become the “biggest continental hub for 
natural gas” through which much of the fuel will be supplied by Russia. (Dempsey, 
2007). Wolfgang Ruttensforter, CEO and Chief Executive of OMV, expressed his desire 
for the participation of Russia in this “continental hub”, “We want the Russians in it. We 
already have forty market participants. We are trading more than 1 bcm a month. All the 
big guys in the world are trading there. We want Russians to be interested in developing 
this biggest hub in Continental Europe” (emphasise added) (Dempsey, 2007). 
 On the other hand, Austria is leading the Nabucco Pipeline project, passing via 
Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and ending in Baumgarten, Austria, which will 
carry natural gas from Central Asia and the Middle East to Europe. This project is 
expected to come into operation in 2011 and to carry 30 bcm natural gas per year. The 
participating companies in the Nabucco Project are BOTAŞ (Turkey), OMV (Austria), 
Transgaz (Romania), MOL (Hungary), and Bulgargaz (Bulgaria) (Nabucco Gas Pipeline 
Project Website, last accessed on 12 June 2008). The significance of the Nabucco 
Project is that it will diversify the energy resources by expanding country of origin 
among energy exporting countries. 
 So, Austria’s high level of energy import dependency, 70.8%, its dependency on 
natural gas imports from Russia, which constitute 70% of its total gas imports (See 
Table 1 in Chapter 1), and its highly concentrated energy markets leaves Austria 
reluctant to support a competitive internal energy market and a common EU energy 
policy. Having highly concentrated energy markets has led Austria to oppose the 
Commission’s proposal of unbundling vertically integrated energy companies in order to 
liberalise the EU electricity and gas markets. Also, relying mostly on Russian natural gas 
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imports in its gross inland energy consumption, 68.8% (See Table 1 in Chapter 1), 
Austria has defined its strategy to become a ‘continental hub’ in which it calls for 
Russian participation. Thus, it seems less likely that Austria is willing to diversify its 
energy suppliers which demonstrates its tenuous support for a common EU energy 
policy. 
Creating a continental hub for natural gas for Europe and building a pipeline that 
will secure the diversification of energy resources are certainly in favour of European 
interests. On the contrary, it could lead to a conflict between Austria, which is dependent 
on Russian gas supplies, and Russia since the Nabucco Pipeline will serve the interests 
of Europe in reducing the dependency on Russian gas (Dempsey, 2007). Therefore, 
Russia expresses its discomfort by strengthening its relations by building Nord Stream 
Pipeline with Germany, developing its Shtokman gas fields with France and having a 
project with Italy on building South Stream Pipeline. 
 74
 CHAPTER 4 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
This thesis aimed to explore the impact of the European Union-Russia relations 
on creating a common EU energy policy in light of two theories of European integration: 
intergovernmentalism and liberal intergovernmentalism. Following this motive, five key 
member states of the European Union, namely Germany, the United Kingdom, France, 
Italy, and Austria are selected to understand the bilateral relations of these countries with 
Russia in supplying their energy need and how the ongoing relationship with Russia 
affects EU policy making process in creating a common energy policy. 
Thus, this thesis has examined first, the significant role of energy in Russian 
foreign policy, second, the energy policy of the EU by studying the Green Papers of 
2000 and 2006 of the European Commission, third, the EU-Russia dialogue on energy 
by looking at the mechanisms for continuing the dialogue, the developments influencing 
the dialogue such as the Ukraine-Russia energy crisis, price hike in Turkmen gas, and 
the Sochi and Samara Summits between the EU and Russia, and last, the existing and 
proposed natural gas pipelines between the EU and Russia. 
Following these topics, the energy outlooks of five key member states of the EU 
and whether these countries have convergent or divergent interests with the EU in 
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creating a common energy policy, placing emphasis on the bilateral relations between 
these selected countries and Russia, have been examined. 
Regarding the topics covered, this thesis reached three main conclusions on how 
the national preferences of five key member states are formed, to what extent these 
preferences affect intergovernmental bargaining or interstate negotiations on creating a 
competitive internal energy market and a common EU energy policy, and whether the 
result of this bargaining process is in favour or against the goal of EU to achieve a 
common energy policy. 
First, the national preferences of five key member states are driven by “issue-
specific economic interests” (Wiener and Diez, 2004: 78-79). The level of dependency 
on energy imports and of concentration in their internal energy markets, and relations of 
their energy companies with the Russian company Gazprom are the major factors 
determining these member states’ national interests. 
Germany (62%), France (52%), Italy (84%) and Austria (70.8%) have high 
levels of dependency on energy imports and they rely on Russian gas imports to 
differing degrees, 41.7%, 19.5%, 31.8%, and 70% respectively. In addition, they have 
highly concentrated energy markets, which a limited number of vertically integrated 
companies dominate, like E.ON and RWE in Germany, EdF and GdF in France, or ENI 
in Italy. So, bilateral relations of these companies with Gazprom by concluding long-
term contracts on gas imports or by agreeing on certain projects of natural gas pipelines 
make these member states more dependent on Russian gas. One outstanding conclusion 
to be drawn is that among the five key member states, the United Kingdom is the only 
country that has a low level of energy import dependency, 14%, and a highly 
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competitive energy market. So, all these factors have a significant role in determining 
the national preferences of five key member states. 
Second, national preferences of Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, 
and Austria have a considerable impact on their decisions on creating a competitive 
internal energy market and a common EU energy policy. Through intergovernmental 
bargaining or interstate negotiations, these member states try to reach the most 
appropriate outcome that would serve their interests best. 
Since Germany, France, Italy and Austria have highly concentrated energy 
markets, and their national preferences are driven by the “commercial interests of 
powerful economic producers” in these markets, they have all opposed the 
Commission’s proposal of unbundling vertically integrated energy companies in order to 
liberalise of EU gas and electricity markets which would in the end pose a threat to their 
energy companies’ interests (Moravcsik, 1998b: 3). These countries are backed by six 
other EU member states as well, namely Bulgaria, Greece, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Latvia, 
and Slovakia. Obviously, the United Kingdom has strongly supported the proposal since 
it has highly competitive energy markets together with Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Sweden, Finland, and Romania. 
Finally, diverse and plural interests of five key member states on the 
liberalisation of EU electricity and gas sectors and their relations with Russia to differing 
degrees had an impact on EU policy making process in achieving a common EU energy 
policy. Since each member state has distinct interests and continues to strengthen their 
energy security given their economic interests and preference formation at national 
level, it would be challenging for EU to reach a consensus on an issue of “high” politics, 
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a common energy policy, which might threaten the national interests of member states 
(Rosamond, 2000: 77). 
Germany’s bilateral negotiations with the Russian company Gazprom to secure 
Germany’s gas imports from Russia by agreeing on the Nord Stream Pipeline project, 
the French company TOTAL’s deal with Gazprom to develop the Shtokman gas fields in 
the Barents Sea, the Italian company ENI’s bilateral talks with Gazprom in order to 
secure Russian gas imports by agreeing on the South Stream Pipeline project, and 
Austria’s desire to become a ‘continental hub’ in which it calls for Russian participation 
make these EU member more dependent on Russia and determine their position towards 
creating a common energy policy. On the other hand, the United Kingdom is a strong 
supporter of EU’s aim to achieve a common energy policy. 
To the extent that EU depends on Russian energy imports, Russia is also 
dependent on EU in order to keep up with its energy policy and to protect its crucial role 
in exporting natural gas. Russia needs financial and technological support from the EU 
to explore the natural energy reserves and to export these resources. At the same time, 
Russia wants its relations with the EU to rest on mutual interests. As EU wants the 
elimination of Russia’s dominance on natural gas exports, protection of foreign 
investments in Russia under the scope of the Energy Charter Treaty and the 
liberalisation of the Russian energy markets, Russia in turn wants to take part in the 
energy markets of the member countries of the EU. 
It is interesting that Russia has bilateral negotiations with the members of the EU 
instead of negotiating with the EU as a whole about the issue of energy. Russia having 
bilateral talks especially with the key members of the EU, such as, Germany, the United 
Kingdom, France, Italy and Austria raises a crucial question in minds: does the EU ‘as a 
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whole’ want to have an energy dialogue with Russia or not? Instead of approaching 
Russia as a union in the area of energy, for now, the EU seems to be comfortable about 
the bilateral negotiations between its members and Russia. So, it is hard to achieve a 
common sense among the EU members. All are sovereign states and many of them are 
not willing to give up their rights on certain issues, in this case a common energy policy, 
in the process of converging national policies into the EU common policies. 
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